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RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF SUPERFUND: 
CAN OLD DOGS BE TAUGHT NEW TRICKS? 
Amy Blaymore* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 150 
million metric tons of hazardous waste was generated across 
the nation in 1981. An additional two thousand pounds of hazard-
ous waste was produced by small manufacturers, whose waste 
activities are not covered by agency regulations. 1 This massive 
amount of toxic chemicals has required federal, state and local 
governments to consider how and where to safely dispose of such 
wastes.2 An even greater problem, one for which no exact statis-
tics can be calculated, is the careless disposal of chemical wastes, 
which for decades has affected and will continue to affect human 
health and the environment. Toxic disasters involving abandoned 
waste sites are occurring more frequently. The problems of Love 
Canal, which was once considered an isolated environmental 
catastrophe, are occurring at an ever increasing rate.3 In re-
* Articles Editor, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW; B.A., Franklin & Marshall College 
(1982); Candidate for J.D., University of Denver College of Law (1985). 
1 N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1983, at AI, col. 3. Note that the small generator exemption 
from federal regulation has become one of the most hotly debated issues facing Congress 
this year. Proposed amendments to RCRA include a bill to remove this exemption so that 
small generators would be subject to the RCRA regulatory regime. See Cumming, 
Legislative Outlook in the Senate: Finishing Unfinished Business, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10002 (ENVTL. L. INST. 1984). 
2 In a recent assessment of 929 hazardous waste sites the EPA concluded that about 
twenty-five percent (25%) of the sites have documented evidence of damage to human 
health or the environment and about ninety percent (90%) ofthe sites have evidence of 
suspected or documented contamination. See Inside EPA, May 13, 1982, at 1 (hereinafter 
cited as EPA study). 
3 For a history ofthe Love Canal disaster, see 126 CONGo REC. S14. See also, Love Canal, 
et al.: The Federal Government's Rights, Responsibilities and Liabilities for the Damages 
From Chemical Dumps, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 273 (1982). 
A recent EPA study predicted that ninety percent of the wastes disposed of in 1980 
1 
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sponse to this growing problem, Congress enacted the Com-
prehensive, Environmental Response, Compensation, Liability 
Act4 (CERCLA). Congress hoped that such a program would fill in 
the gaps left by the other two major federaP vehicles for regulat-
were done so improperly, "thereby presenting significant imminent hazards to the public 
health." Seltzer, Personal Injury Hazardous Waste Litigation: A Proposal for Tort Re-
form,10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 797, 798 (1983),citing B. BROWN, LAYING WASTE-THE 
POISONING OF AMERICA BY TOXIC CHEMICALS 2 (3d ed. 1980). 
• 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1983). 
5 There are other federal statutes which may be used to impose liability for dumping 
chemical waste. The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), section 1431, 42 U.S.C. § 300i 
(a) (1983), may be used upon evidence that a contaminant, likely to enter a public 
water system, may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to the health of 
persons. The Clean Air Act, section 303(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7603(a) (1983) provides the EPA 
with the authority to issue emergency abatement orders when "a pollution source or 
combination of sources" constitutes an imminent hazlJ,rd. The Toxic Substances Control 
Act, section 7, 15 U.S.C. § 2606(a)(i) (1983), also provides an "imminent hazard" provision, 
which covers disposal activities. The statute's main use, however, has been to regulate 
the disposal of PCB's, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1). See generally Mott, Liability for 
Cleanup of Inactive Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 15 NAT. RESOURCES LAW 379, 
387-91 (1982). 
Furthermore, although this article is limited in scope to federal law, liability may 
be imposed for improper waste disposal pursuant to state and local laws. The state may 
bring action against polluters under both federal law and their own state and local 
pollution control laws, which frequently are even more stringent than the federal 
statutes. Savings provisions are provided in all of the federal statutes discussed in this 
article. 
RCRA section 3009, 42 U.S.C. § 6929 provides: 
[N]othing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit any State or politicai 
subdivision thereof from imposing any requirements, including those for site 
selection, which are more stringent than those imposed by such regulations. 
See, e.g., State v. Rollins Environmental Services of Louisiana, Inc., 398 So.2d 1122 (La. 
1981) ("State has exclusive jurisdiction over regulation of hazardous waste"). 
CERCLA section 114, 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) similarly provides: 
[N]othing in this chapter shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any 
State from imposing additional liability or requirements with respect to the 
release of hazardous substances within such State. 
In fact, thirty-six states have, to date, enacted fifty hazardous cleanup funds and related 
provisions. While some of these staj;e "Superfunds" predated the federal act, most simply 
set forth some or all of CERCLA's response, compensation and liability provisions. See 
State Superfund Statutes, 1984 (ENVTL. L. INST. 1983). See also Warren, State Hazardous 
Waste Superfunds and CERCLA: Conflict or Complement, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. ~ 
(ENVTL. L. INST. 1983). \ 03~ 
CERCLA does, however, mandate certain limitations upon the use of both the federal 
and a state "Superfund." In section 114(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9614(b), a person is prohibited 
from receiving compensation for removal costs or damages from both federal Superfund 
(or other federal law) and from a state law. Moreover, except as otherwise provided, no 
person is required to contribute to any fund, the purpose of which is to pay compensation 
for claims for any response costs or damages or claims which may be compensated under 
Superfund. CERCLA section 114(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c). 
Section 311(0)(2) and (3) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0)(1)-(3) that Act's 
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ing hazardous substances, the Clean Water Act6 and the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act.7 
Because the main goal of CERCLA is to promptly clean up 
abandoned waste sites,8 many of its provisions are likely to be 
applied to transactions and events which culminated many years 
before the Act's enactment. Such a retroactive application of the 
law may be charged as unconstitutional, especially when parties 
are held liable for their waste activities9 which were lawful prior 
to CERCLA's enactment. If this challenge to CERCLA is upheld, 
then the only available statutory mechanism expressly enacted to 
address the problem of abandoned and inactive waste sites10 
would be rendered essentially useless. 
This Article will examine four constitutional bases for chal-
lenging the retroactive application of CERCLA: the due process 
clause of the fifth amendment,l1 the contracts clause,12 the takings 
clause of the fifth amendment,13 and the ex post facto doctrine.14 
The first three of these constitutional challenges are based upon 
the principle of substantive due process, which requires that legis-
lation bear a rational relationship to a legitimate end of the 
government.15 The ex post facto doctrine of the Constitution pro-
savings provision, is identical to the analogous provisions in RCRA and CERCLA, except 
the Clean Water Act substitutes the word "section" for the word "chapter" as found in 
the latter two provisions. Thus, the Clean Water Act is arguably more restrictive than 
the other two statutes, as a state or local law or regulation could arguably be preempted 
by a provision found outside section 311. See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, 
Inc. 411 U.S. 325 (1973). 
See generally Trauberman, Compensation For Toxic Substances Pollution: Michigan 
Case Study, 10 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST. 1980); Manatt & Phelps, Statutory and 
Common Law Liability For Injury and Damage Caused By Releases of Hazardous Waste: 
A Study Conducted for the California Hazardous Waste Management Council (Draft 
Report, 1983) (hereinafter Manatt Study); Rogers, Liability Under RCRA's Regulatory 
System, in ExpANDING LIABILITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 51 (A. Macbeth ed. 1981). 
6 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1983). 
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (Supp. 1981). 
8 See infra text and notes at notes 29-55. 
9 Waste activities, for purposes of this article, constitute waste generation, trans-
portation and disposal activities. 
10 See infra text and notes at notes 19-52. 
11 U.S. CONST. amend. v. ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property ... 
without due process of law.") 
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. ("No State shall ... pass any ... law impairing the obligation 
of contracts.") 
13 U.S. CONST. amend. V. (" ... nor shall private property be taken for public use 
without just compensation.") 
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. ("No ... ex post facto law shall be passed.") 
15 Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 592 F.2d 947, 960 (7th Cir. 1979). 
See infra text and notes at notes 134-85. 
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hibits Congress16 and the state legislatures17 from enacting laws, 
criminal in nature, which impair past transactions. IS Despite 
these constitutional limitations, this article will conclude that the 
retroactive application of CERCLA is constitutional and neces-
sary to effectuate the congressional intent to clean up abandoned 
waste sites. 
II. FILLING IN THE "GAPS" WITH CERCLA 
Prior to CERCLA's enactment, the major federal vehicles for 
regulating hazardous substances were the Clean Water Act19 and 
the Resource, Conservation and Recovery Act20 (RCRA). The goal 
of the Clean Water Act, as amended in 1972, was to eliminate 
pollutant discharges into the navigable waters by 1985. As with 
the comparable provisions of CERCLA,21 the Clean Water Act 
provides the EPA with two enforcement options when hazardous 
substances are released into the environment: the government 
can either clean up the waste itself and then seek reimbursement 
from the responsible party, or it may order the cleanup adminis-
tratively or through injunctive relief.22 
RCRA was enacted in October of 1976, in response to public 
outcry over damage to the environment and public health due to 
the inadequate disposal of hazardous wastes.23 The Act estab-
lishes a regulatory system to track hazardous substances from 
the time of their generation to the time of their disposal.24 It also 
requires compliance with certain procedures to ensure the safe 
and secure treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous sub-
stances.25 By regulating hazardous wastes from their "cradle" to 
their "grave," RCRA was intended to regulate the handling of 
hazardous wastes, which was considered "the last remaining 
16 See infra text and notes at notes 261-75. 
17 There is a u.s. constitutional prohibition against state ex post facto laws. For 
purposes of this article, however, this provision will not be discussed. See U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 10 ("No State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto law.") 
18 See generally 2 Sands, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
§ 41.02 (4th ed. 1972). See also infra text and notes at notes 260-62. 
19 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1983). 
20 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (Supp. 1981). 
21 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607 (Supp. 1981). 
22 33 U.S.C. § 1321(bX1) (1983). 
23 See H. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 6238. 
24 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6934 (Supp. 1981). 
25 [d. §§ 6923-6925. 
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loophole" in environmental law. 26 By far the most widely litigated 
provision of RCRA is section 7003, commonly referred to as the 
"imminent hazard" provision.27 This section provides the EPA 
with the broad authority to bring suit in federal district court to 
"restrain persons from contributing to any waste activities which 
may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to 
health on the environment."28 
In the aftermath of the Love Canal29 and other hazardous 
waste disasters, it became obvious, however, that neither the 
existing legislation30 nor the common lawH were adequate to clean 
26 H. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 6238, 6241. 
.. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. 1981). 
28 I d. Defining the term "imminent and substantial endangerment" is in and of itself a 
thorny issue. One court defined it as "that sort of emergency situation in which applica-
tion of the general provisions of the Act would be too time-consuming to effectively ward 
off the threatened harm to health or environment." See United States V. Hardage, No. 
CIV-80-1031-W, slip op. (W.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 1982). See also United States V. Reilly Tar 
and Chemical Co., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1110-11 (D. Minn. 1982). The general consensus of 
the courts has been to follow this principal and hence in order to state a cause of action 
under section 7003, the government need only prove that the present condition poses a 
clear threat to human health and the environment. 
The legislative histories of the "imminent hazard" provisions of section 118 of the 
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7603, section 604 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1364 and 
section 1431 of the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300(i)(a), are frequently utilized 
by both courts and scholars to better understand RCRA section 7003. See Hinds, Liabil-
ity Under Federal Law for Hazardous Waste Injuries, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 16-18 
(1982); HazardCYUB Waste: EPA, Justice ~nvoke Emergency Authority Common Law Liti-
gation Campaign Against Dumpsites, 10 ENVTL. L. REP. 10034,10037 (ENVTL. L. INST. 
1981). 
28 See supra note 3. 
30 See generally H. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess., pt. I, at 18, reprinted in 1980 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 6119, 6120; S. REP. No. 84~, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess. 10-12, 
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 6119. See also Comment, Generator 
Liability Under Superfund For Clean-Up of Abandoned Hazardous Waste Dumpsites, 130 
U. PA. L. REV. 1229,1231 (1982). (hereinafter cited as Comment, Generator Liability.) 
31 An injured party may bring suit under the common law tort system utilizing the 
theories of nuisance, trespass, negligence, strict liability and inverse condemnation. 
These theories have not, however, proven adequate due to the usually successful de-
fenses of causation, statute of limitations, reasonableness of conduct, assumption of risk 
and contributory negligence. For a general discussion of the uses of state common law 
tort theories and the defenses thereto in environmental causes See Trauberman, supra 
note 6 at 50021; Trauberman, Compensating Victims ofToxics Substances Pollution: An 
Analysis of Existing Federal Statutes, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1981); Comment, 
Hazardous Waste: Preserving the Nuisance Remedy, 33 STAN. L. REV. 676 (1981); Note, 
An Analysis of Common Law and Statutory Remedies for Hazardous Waste Injuries, 12 
RUTGERS L. J. 117 (1980); Ginsberg, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom 
Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 869 (1981); Fabic, Pursuing a Cause of Action in Hazardous 
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up these and the many other yet to be discovered abandoned 
dump sites. Recognizing these inadequacies and the intense pub-
lic discontent with the existing regulatory system, Congress, in 
December, 1980, enacted CERCLA,32 which ideally33 was to be the 
statutory answer to the abandoned waste site problem. 
The Act provides two alternative mechanisms by which the 
government can clean up abandoned sites. The first is the Act's 
Hazardous Substances Response Fund, commonly referred to as 
the Superfund. The fund, financed jointly by industry and the 
federal government,34 is utilized to compensate state and federal 
governments3S for costs incurred as a result of containment, re-
Waste Pollution Cases, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 533 (1980); Hurwitz,Environmental Health: 
An Analysis of Available and Proposed Remedies For Victims of Toxic Waste Contamina-
tion, 7 AM. J. LAW MED. 61 (1981); Baurer, Love Canal: Common Law Approaches to a 
Modern Tragedy, 11 ENVTL. L. 131 (1980). See also Hinds, supra note 28, at 14 n.105; 
Manatt Study, supra note 5, at 104-208, for discussion of damages under common law. 
32 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657. 
33 CERCLA has not been without its critics. See generally Special Report, 
Superfund-How to Rebuild a Badly Damaged Program, ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM, 
June, 1983. Most of the criticisms ofCERCLA are premised upon the statute's failure to 
provide for private victim compensation. The "Section 301(e) Panel" set up pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 9651(e) was instructed by Congress "to determine the adequacy of existing 
common law and statutory remedies providing legal redress for harm to man and the 
environment caused by the release of hazardous substances into the environment." The 
Committee's "two tier" recommendations can be summarized as follows: (1) Special taxes 
on chemical and oil industries to finance the fund (Tier I); and (2) Amendments to 
existing state personal injury laws, including endorsement of a liberal discovery rule. 
See generally, Compensating Victims of Environmental Poisons, ENVIRONMENTAL 
FORUM 3 (Jan. 1983) Outen, Injury from Hazardous Chemicals: Compensating Innocent 
Bystanders, ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM 6 (Feb. 1983); Garret, Compensating Victims of 
Toxic Substances: Issues Concerning Proposed Federal Legislation, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10172 (ENVTL. L. INST. 1983); Grad, Hazardous Waste Victim Compensation: The Report 
of the § 301(e) Superfund Study Group, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10234 (ENVTL. L. INST. 1983); 
Anderson, The Case for Statutory Compensation, ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM 21. 
Legislation has been introduced incorporating some or all of the Committee's recom-
mendations. See generally, G. Nothstein, Toxic Torts: Litigation of Hazardous Sub-
stances Cases, § 10.17 (1984); Cummings, supra, note 1, at 10007; Compensating Toxics 
'Victims', ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM 15 (July, 1983). 
Model legislation has also been drafted. See Trauberman, Statutory Reform of Toxic 
Torts: Relieving Legal, Scientific and Economic Burdens on Chemical Victims, 7 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1983); See also Manatt Study, supra note 5, at 266-85. 
Adverse reaction to these legislative proposals has been generated mainly by insur-
ance and industry organizations. See Cheek, Solutions to a Non-Existent Problem, ENVI-
RONMENTAL FORUM 6 (Mar. 1983); Baron, Compensation, Yes, But Not to the Exclusion 
of Common Tort Remedies, ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM at 21. See also 13 ENVTL. REP. 375 
(BNA); 14 ENVTL. REP. 523 (BNA), for reactions of industry representatives. 
34 42 U.S.C. § 9631. 
35 See City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (D.C. Pa. 1982) 
wherein a non-governmental entity and local government were permitted to file suit for 
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moval and cleanup of wastes from abandoned sites when the 
responsible parties are unknown or unable to undertake those 
remedial measures.36 Using the $1.6 billion trust fund, EPA is 
authorized, under section 10437 of the statute, to conduct cleanup 
activities. These activities are financed pursuant to section 107,38 
which authorizes EPA to seek reimbursement for some or all of 
its costs from a variety of parties that are presently or were 
previously39 associated with the site. At the time of CERCLA's 
enactment, the Fund was seen by some legislators as the key 
solution to the abandoned dump site problem: 
This fund is to be used to find, assess and, where warranted, 
clean up abandoned hazardous waste sites when the company 
or companies responsible for creating the problem either no 
longer exist, cannot be identified or lack the financial re-
sources to clean up their own messes. Residents of areas 
affected by such "orphan" dumps simply have no place else to 
turn for abatement of this problem, which has led to poisoned 
drinking water, increased incidence of cancer, birth defects, 
miscarriages, skin ailments and respiratory ailments.40 
In its enforcement of CERCLA, EPA has not relied on section 107, 
largely because the estimated cost of cleanup for all sites would 
come to an approximate $25 to $44 billion.41 In the alternative, 
EPA has relied considerably upon section 106, which provides 
EPA with the option to force others to do the cleanup by request-
reimbursement of "response costs" after initiating clean-up activities. In addition, that 
court held that such parties may bring a section 107 action against waste generators 
despite the fact that the city was potentially liable to the federal government as the 
owner of the contaminated site. See also United States v. Reilly Tar and Chemical Corp., 
546 F. Supp. at 1100, wherein the court upheld a CERCLA section 107 claim by the 
federal, state and local governments against a waste disposer whose improper dumping 
caused contamination of groundwater. See also In re Claim of Atlantic City Municipal 
Utilities Authority, ENVTL. L. REP. PEND. LIT. 65807 (ENVTL. L. INST.) (claim filed Nov. 
17,1983). 
36 42 U.S.C. § 9612(b)(I)(B). 
37 Id. at § 9604. 
38 Id. at § 9607. 
39 For a discussion of which pre-enactment parties may be subject to liability, see 
generally Manatt Study, supra note 5, at 56; Hinds, supra note 5, at 20-21; Mott, supra 
note 4, at 379. 
40 Administration Testimony to the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution and Re-
source Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 2d. 
Sess. 93 (statement of Thomas Jorling, Ass't Administrator, Water and Waste Mgt. EPA) 
(hereinafter cited as Hearings). 
41 See Orloff, Superfund and The Courts, ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM 5 (Jan. 1983). 
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ing an injunction in court or by itself issuing an administrative 
order.42 
Recent court decisions reflect this congressional intent and 
have held that CERCLA, particularly as opposed to RCRA, is the 
proper statutory mechanism for imposing liability upon parties 
who, prior to the Act's enactment, contributed to43 disposal ac-
tivities. In United States v. Waste Industries,44 for example, the 
court disallowed the use of RCRA section 7003 to force either the 
operator of a closed waste dump or the then current owner of the 
property upon which the abandoned site was situated to abate the 
pollution of groundwater by chemicals leaching from the site.45 
The court supported its holding by pointing to the fact that the 
language of section 7003 was couched in the present tense. Fur-
thermore, the court found that the section's structure implied a 
congressional intent not to use RCRA as the remedy to problems 
of abandoned and inactive waste dumps.46 The main thrust of the 
court's decision appears to come from its discussion of CERCLA. 
In particular, the court saw the passage of CERCLA as Congress' 
remedy to the problem of inactive waste disposal sites: 
First, Congress recognized that . . . a gap existed in the 
regulatory scheme fashioned through RCRA. That gap in-
volved the problems caused by the inactive waste disposal 
sites. Second, the Superfund legislation was designed to fill 
that void. Third, ... the passage of Superfund without and 
instead of an amendment to section 7003 demonstrates the 
inapplicability of that provision to [abandoned waste sites].47 
To the court, the applicatipn of RCRA to abandoned or inactive 
waste sites is unnecessary because Congress explicitly enacted 
Superfund for that purpose . 
.. Hearings, supra note 40, at 62. 
<3 The "contributing to" standard is taken from the language of RCRA section 7003, 42 
U.S.C. § 6973, and will be used generally throughout this article . 
.. United States v. Waste Industries, 556 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.C. 1982). See also Rogers, 
Three Years of Superfund, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10361 (ENVTL. L. INST. 1983); Reed, RCRA's 
Imminent Hazard Provision and Inactive Hazardous Waste Dumps: A Reappraisal After 
U.S. v. Waste Industries, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10074 (ENVTL. L. INST. 1983) . 
.. See Reed, supra note 44, at 10074. 
46 In particular, the Court noted that because section 7003 is found under the "Miscel-
laneous Provisions," following the citizens suit provision, which provides no substantive 
standards, and only establishes standing, it too was only jurisdictional and "was not 
designed to remedy past acts." Reed, supra note 44, at 10077. 
47 United States v. Waste Industries, 556 F. Supp. at 1317. 
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Similarly, in United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp.;lB EPA 
sought relief, pursuant to CERCLA section 106, against a waste 
generator who was also the owner and operator of the disposal 
facility. The generator was charged with contaminating ground-
water caused by the leaching of chemicals from the dump site.49 
Reilly Tar sought dismissal by arguing, inter alia, that section 106 
does not extend to prior owners of an inactive disposal site. The 
court rejected the argument, and stated: 
Section 106(a) is broader in scope than section 7003 of RCRA, 
and whatever concerns the court has regarding the applica-
bility of section 7003 to prior owners of inactive sites does not 
apply to section 106(a). Section 106(a) ... contains no lim-
itations on the classes of persons within its reach. Nor does it 
contain language indicating that it applies only to present 
owners of waste disposal sites.5O (emphasis added) 
This judicial tendency to favor CERCLA as the proper mecha-
nism for regulating abandoned dumps has been more recently 
followed in United States v. Wade (Wade 1).51 In that case the 
United States brought suit under CERCLA section 106 and 
RCRA section 7003, for recovery against the owners of the waste 
site, the waste transporters and six past off-site generators.52 In 
considering these claims the court focused its analysis upon the 
overall structure of CERCLA, particularly the liability provision 
of section 107.53 Following Waste Industries, the Wade I court 
concluded that CERCLA rather than RCRA was intended by 
Congress to be the primary mechanism for the cleanup of aban-
doned waste sites: 
CERCLA was specifically designed to plug gaps in the gov-
ernment's then existing anti-pollution program. In particu-
.. United States v. Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1113. See generally Orloff, supra note 41, 
at 6-7. 
49 In addition to its claims under section 106, the United States, along with the State of 
Minnesota and the City of St. Louis Park, brought suit under RCRA section 7003 and 
CERCLA section 107. The state and local governments also alleged a number of claims 
pursuant to state and local statutes and regulations. United States v. Reilly Tar. 546 F. 
Supp. at 1105. 
50 United States v. Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1113. 
51 United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (Wade I). See generally Reed, 
supra note 44, at 10077; Orloff, supra note 41, at 6; Manatt Study, supra note 5, at 56. 
52 The EPA initially brought suit against both the owners of the site and the trans-
porters ofthe waste. On November 10, 1981, however, the agency amended its complaint 
to include six past off-site generators as additional defendants. See Orloff, supra note 41, 
at 6. 
53 Wade I, 546 F. Supp. at 787. 
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lar, it was designed to deal squarely with the problem of aban-
doned or 'orphan' hazardous waste dumps, a problem which 
RCRA had not adequately addressed.54 (emphasis added) 
The court, however, rejected the claims under section 106 and 
section 7003 and held sections 104 and 107 as the proper statutory 
authority to support an action against a past-generator. 55 
In light of the Act's legislative history and numerous court 
decisions, it is reasonable to conclude that CERCLA is the proper 
statutory solution for the EPA to consider when presented with 
an abandoned waste site problem. Thus, for purposes of analyzing 
retroactivity challenges, this article will be limited in its scope 
to CERCLA. 
III. RETROACTIVE ApPLICATION OF CERCLA 
The imposition of financial liability pursuant to Superfund sec-
tions 106 and 107, where injunctive relief is sought against 
parties who, prior to the enactment of the Act, contributed to 
waste activities, can be challenged as unconstitutionally retroac-
tive.56 A retroactive statute57 is generally defined as "one which 
gives to pre-enactment conduct a different legal effect from that 
which it would have had without the passage of the statute."58 
Such statutes are usually highly suspect as "there is a general 
consensus among all people that notice or warning of the rules 
that are to be applied to determine their affairs should be given in 
advance of the actions whose effects are to be judged by them."59 
54 [d. at 792, quoting H.R. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 25 (1980); S. REP. No. 848, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 6119. 
55 Wade I, 546 F. Supp at 793. 
56 For a comprehensive analysis of these arguments, written for industry defense 
purposes, see KIRKLAND & ELUS, SUPERFUND: KEy LIABiliTY ISSUES, prepared for the 
Chemical Manufacturers Association, at Chapter VI (1982) (hereinafter cited as CMAJ 
Superfund Study). See also Manatt Study, supra note 5, at Chapter IV. But see Comment, 
Generator Liability supra note 30 at 1234-50. 
57 Throughout this article, the terms "retroactive" and "retrospective" will be used 
interchangeably . 
.. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 
73 HARV. L. REV. 692 (1960). An oft-quoted definition of retroactivity is that of Justice 
Story in Society for Propagating the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F.Cas. 756, 767 (C.C.D.N.H. 
1814) (No. 13, 156) quoted in Sturges v. Carter, 114 U.S. 511, 519 (1884): "[E]very statute 
which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a 
new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transac-
tions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective." 
.. Sands, supra note 18, at 492. See also Hochman, supra note 58, at 492; Smith, 
Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 6 TEXAS L. REV. 409 (1928). 
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Generally disfavored, retroactive legislation has been likened to 
"dog law"-training dogs by waiting until they act in some for-
bidden way and then punishing them for their conduct.60 
The principal constitutional limitations on Congress' power to 
enact retroactive legislation are, in the civil context, founded on 
the due process clause of the fifth amendment, the contract clause 
of article I, section 10 as incorporated by the due process clause, 
and the takings clause of the fifth amendment. In addition, pur-
suant to the constitutional prohibition in article I, section 9 
against ex post facto laws, Congress is forbidden from applying 
criminal penalties retroactively. However, unlike the ex post facto 
doctrine and contract clauses, which provide explicit constitu-
tional prohibitions against retroactive laws, the due process 
clause fails to delineate any express criteria to determine when 
retroactive legislation is unconstitutional. 61 
In any case, each of these doctrines arguably could be applied to 
invalidate various provisions of Superfund. First, the imposition 
of liability pursuant to section 104 may attach to pre-enactment 
conduct a new duty or obligation and as such violate the waste 
contributor's due process rights under the fifth amendment.62 
Second, by imposing liability upon generators and transporters of 
waste for the damages caused by improper disposal, section 107 
effectively obliterates pre-enactment contractual agreements to 
release anyone of the above enumerated parties from liability for 
such damages.63 Third, many of the administrative orders, when 
applied retroactively, may in essence constitute a "total physical 
invasion" of the waste-site owner's property, thereby violating 
that person's rights under the takings clause.64 Finally, the Super-
fund provisions which impose fines and treble punitive damages 
upon pollutors who fail to comply with administrative orders may 
arguably violate the ex postfacto clause if applied retroactively.55 
60 Sands, supra note 18 at § 41.02, citing, BOWRING, WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM V 
235 (1962). 
61 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § VI, 471 (2d ed. 1983) 
(hereinafter cited as NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW). 
62 See infra text and notes at notes 107-92. 
63 See infra text and notes at notes 93-120. 
64 See infra text and notes at notes 21-60. 
s:; See infra text and notes at notes 61-75. Note that this same argument based upon 
the ex post facto doctrine may be used against RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6973(d) and (e) and the 
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) and 1319(a)(l) and (a)(3). 
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Not until 1983 did any federal court66 faced with a CERCLA 
challenge67 have to analyze the Act to determine whether it could 
be applied retroactively to impose liability upon contributors to 
pre-enactment waste activities. In State of Ohio v. Georgeoff68 
(Georgeoff) the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio reached an unprecedented holding that CERCLA 
section 107 may be applied retroactively to impose liability upon 
66 See State Dept. of Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp., 440 A.2d 455 (New 
Jersey 1982), afl'd in part, No. A 50/51, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 20837 (ENVTL. L. INST. 1983). 
See infra note 94. 
67 Numerous retroactivity challenges have been brought in RCRA cases. See, e.g., 
United States v. Diamond Shamrock, No. C80-1857, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. 20819, 20822 (N.D. 
Ohio May 29, 1981) wherein the court held with regard to RCRA section 7003: 
The tangential issue of whether § 6973 as applied to antecedent acts creates an 
impermissible retroactive application must be answered negatively. Section 
6973 provides for injunctive relief, as opposed to compensatory or punitive relief, 
of conditions presently existing. To hold that remedial environmental statutes 
could or should not apply to conduct engaged in antecedent to the enactment of 
such statutes, when the effects of such conduct create a present environmental 
threat, would constitute an irrational judicial foreclosure of legislative attempts 
to rectify pre-existing and currently existing environmental abuses. 
See also United States v. Price (Price I), 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1072 (D.C. N.J. 1981) ("Because 
the gravamen of a 7003 action is the current existence of hazardous condition, not the 
past commission of any acts, we see no retroactivity problem with the statute."); United 
States v. Reilly Tar Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. at 1108. ("Although Reilly Tar no longer 
engages in ongoing activities at the site, this is no basis for dismissing the action ... 
[RCRA] is aimed at the prevention or amelioration of harmful conditions, rather than 
the cessation of any particular human conduct.") Note that in United States v. Solvents 
Recovery Service of New England, 496 F. Supp. 1127 at 1142 (D.C. Conn. 1980) the court, 
in rejecting the defendant's argument that the imposition of section 7003 liability to 
pre-RCRA activities was unconstitutionally retroactive, applied a different mode of 
analysis. That court interpreted section 7003 as being jurisdictional thereby incorporat-
ing the federal common law of nuisance rather than imposing new substantive liabilities. 
Since that court found that "the federal common law of nuisance is not likely to exceed 
significantly in scope or severity the state law of nuisance to which the defendants were 
already subject when they engaged in their pre-RCRA disposal practices" the section 
was not impermissibly retroactive. Thus that court did not even require an allegation of 
ongoing acts of disposal. 
There are two potential problems with this line of analysis. First, even assuming that 
section 7003 is, as the Solvents court held, jurisdictional, a court in another state may 
still face the defense of retroactivity if the application of the federal common law of 
nuisance exceeds the severity of that state's common law. See Duke, Using ReRA's 
Imminent Hazard Provision in Hazardous Waste Emergencies, 9 EcOLOGY L. Q. 599, 616 
(1981). Second, if, as other courts have held, section 7003 is construed as substantive then 
the question remains as to whether the standards set forth in that provision are 
themselves more stringent than the common law principles being applied in the state in 
which the injury has occurred. 
66 State of Ohio v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983). See also United States 
v. Stringfellow, No. CV-83-2501-MML, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 20388 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9 1984). 
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hazardous waste transporters.69 Despite this holding, the court 
failed to consider the constitutionality of retroactivity. Most re-
cently, however, in United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical 
and Chemical Co., Inc.70 (NEPACCO), the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Missouri held that the retroac-
tive application of CERCLA sections 106 and 107 did not violate 
the defendant's due process rights under the fifth amendment. 
That court, however, was not presented with constitutional chal-
lenges to CERCLA under either the contracts clause, the takings 
clause, or the ex post facto doctrine. As a result, challenges 
brought pursuant to these provisions remain viable for defen-
dants in CERCLA actions. 
After an overview of the court's opinion in GeorgeofJ,71 this 
article will analyze the court's opinion inNEPACCO. 72 In addition 
to that court's justification, this article will provide a more de-
tailed discussion of additional reasons why the retroactive appli-
cation of CERCLA should be held constitutional under the due 
process clause of the fifth amendment.73 This article will then 
analyze the other three constitutional limitations upon retrospec-
tive application of CERCLA. It will conclude that none of these 
doctrines are strong enough to overcome CERCLA's constitu-
tionality.74 
A. State of Ohio v. Georgeoff 
The issue in Georgeoff was whether section 107 of CERCLA 
may be applied retroactively to impose financial liability upon 
pre-enactment waste transporters. The State of Ohio (Ohio) and 
the United States Justice Department (Justice) brought suit 
69 The fact that the holding in the Georgeoff case is limited to transporters of waste 
materials is an important one, especially when the constitutionality of the decision is 
considered. Generators may be in a better position to raise these constitutional objec-
tions than will transporters and dumpsite operators. 
70 United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc., 579 F. Supp. 
823 (W.D. Mo. 1983). 
71 See infra text and notes at notes 75-106. 
72 See infra text and notes at notes 115-32. 
73 See infra text and notes at notes 134-92. 
74 For discussion of CERCLA's constitutionality under the contracts clause, see infra 
text and notes at notes 193-221. For a discussion of CERCLA's constitutionality under 
the takings clause, see infra text and notes at notes 224-60. See infra text and notes at 
notes 261-75 for a discussion of CERCLA's constitutionality under the ex post facto 
doctrine. 
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against Browning-Ferris Industries (BFI) and others75 inter alia, 
to collect the costs related to the cleanup of the "Deerfield Dump" 
(Dump). From 1975 to 1976, BFI transported an assortment of 
chemical wastes to the Dump. In its motions to dismiss, BFI 
asserted that the liability provisions of CERCLA, specifically sec-
tion 107(a), should not be construed to impose liability retroac-
tively for pre-enactment acts of transporters.76 The court dis-
agreed, and in reaching its conclusion, addressed the following 
issues: 1) whether the retroactive application of CERCLA is nec-
essary; 2) what presumptions apply in determining whether 
CERCLA should be interpreted to impose retroactive liability; 
and 3) whether Congress has overridden the presumption against 
applying CERCLA retroactively. 
With regard to the first issue, Ohio and Justice set forth two 
alternative arguments as to why a retroactive application of 
section 107 would be unnecessary. Ohio alleged that there were 
certain cases in which statutes were not held to be retroactive 
even though the imposition of liability pursuant to such statutes 
was premised solely upon past acts.77 Ohio relied upon the follow-
ing proposition: 
'a statute is not rendered retroactive merely because facts or 
requisites upon which the act's subsequent action depends or 
some of them, are drawn from a time antecedent to enact-
ment.'78 
75 The defendants fell into three categories-the former owners and operators of the 
Dump, the generators of the hazardous waste located at the Dump, and the transporters 
of the hazardous wastes to the Dump. In a forty-two page complaint, Ohio alleges 
fourteen causes of action against forty-two defendants. The. first three allege violations 
of CERCLA. In the opinion discussed herein, the court considered BFI's (the transport-
ers') motions for dismissal of those three counts. 
76 BFI's second set of arguments focused on the mandatory prerequisites to bringing 
suit, set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). In particular, BFI argued that (1) Ohio did not meet 
its burden of showing actions "not inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan;" 
(2) a cooperative agreement between Ohio and the federal government is required prior 
to bringing a lawsuit under § 9607(a); (3) Ohio had not sustained any "costs of removal or 
remedial action incurred" within the meaning of the statute; and (4) Ohio had not 
sustained appropriate damages to its "natural resources." With regard to the first 
argument the court concluded that the new National Contingency Plan, revised subse-
quent to the filing of the parties' briefs, rendered the argument moot. The court next 
concluded that a section 107 lawsuit may be maintained without first entering into an 
agreement with the federal government for response with the federal government for 
response costs under section 104. With regard to whether Ohio's complaint sufficiently 
alleged "cost incurred" as required by section 107(aX4XA), the court ruled in the affirma-
tive. Last, the court found Ohio's claim for damages to natural resources pursuant to 
section 107(aX4Xc) sufficient. 
77 State of Ohio v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1303. 
76 [d. 
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While agreeing with this principle, the court saw no reason to 
diverge from the generally accepted principles79 of retroactivity, 
in particular its own proposition that 
. . . a statute will not require a retroactive application 
[merely] because it draws upon antecedent facts for its opera-
tion; but it may not impose liability based solely upon consid-
erations already pass without applying retroactively.so (em-
phasis added) 
Ohio failed to allege any post-enactment conduct on the part of 
BFI and despite well settled principles to the contrary, sought to 
impose non-retroactive liability for conduct occurring exclusively 
before CERCLA's enactment. 
The cases relied upon by Ohio,s1 in its attempts to persuade the 
court that other jurisdictions have taken exception to this general 
proposition, were all distinguishable. One such case cited by Ohio 
is United States v. Diamond Shamrock COrp.,82 which the George-
off court distinguished in the following manner: 
Because Diamond Shamrock retained control of the dump 
after the date of the statute's passage, liability could be prem-
ised upon continuing to maintain the dump in an improper 
condition ... &'1 (emphasis added) 
All of the cases relied upon by Ohio involved some form of post-
enactment conduct, so the statutory applications in those cases 
were not retroactive.84 Therefore, courts such as that deciding 
Diamond Shamrock,s;, which prior to Georgeoff were faced with 
constitutional challenges to the imposition of RCRA and 
CERCLA upon pre-enactment conduct, were able to avoid decid-
ing the retroactivity issue because the plaintiffs alleged some type 
of post-enactment, continuing activity on the part of the ac-
cused.86 
Justice, on the other hand, recognized the importance of distin-
guishing pre-enactment from post-enactment conduct. They al-
7. See id. at 1304. See also supra text and notes at notes 58-59. 
80 Id. at 1303. 
81 For a list of cases relied upon by Ohio and the court's discussion thereon, see id. 
82 See supra note 69. 
&"l State of Ohio v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1304. 
84 Id. 
86 United States v. Diamond Shamrock, No. C80-1857, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. 20189 (N.D. 
Ohio May 29, 1981). 
86 See generally cases cited supra note 67. 
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leged that because the waste had yet to be removed from the site, 
it constituted a continuing public nuisance and therefore estab-
lished the requisite post-enactment conduct.87 In support of its 
argument, Justice cited a number of cases which, it contended, 
held that legislation designed to alleviate a continuing public 
nuisance did not act retroactively.88 The court rejected this con-
tention because Justice failed to allege any continuing ownership 
or control by BFI over the site.89 
In reaching this conclusion, the Georgeoff court diverged from 
the analyses used by other courts facing analogous challenges 
under RCRA. In United States v. Price,oo for example, the United 
States District Court for New Jersey, as affirmed by the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals, imposed liability pursuant to RCRA 
upon past operators, who subsequently sold their chemical waste 
site, for dumping that occurred at the site during 1971-1972, prior 
to the sale. In finding these parties liable although they were not 
"presently contributing" to the disposal of wastes, the court 
stated: 
. . . It is evident that the current leaking of contaminants 
from the landfill is being contributed to in a large measure by 
the failure of the Price defendants to store properly the 
chemical wastes. Certainly, that proper storage should have 
been done ... when the wastes were originally deposited in 
the landfill ... it cannot be denied that their continued failure 
to rectify the hazardous condition they created has been and 
is contributing to the leaking that is now occurring.9! 
Applying the analysis in Price to the circumstances in Georgeojf it 
would appear that merely alleging some sort of current, ongoing 
damage, such as a public nuisance, would be enough to bypass the 
need for retroactive application; the faCt that BFI was not pres-
ently exercising any control or ownership over the dump should 
have been deemed irrelevant. 
81 State of Ohio v. Georgeoff, supra note 68, at 1304. In particular, the Justice Depart-
ment focused upon the fact that "release or threatened release" was required under 
9607(a) to trigger liability. Justice argued that BFI's disposal of the waste materials at 
the dump constituted continuing "release" until the waste is removed. . 
88 See Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188 (1924); Chicago & Alton Railroad Company v. 
Transberger, 238 U.S. 67 (1914); City of Bakersfield v. Miller, 64 Cal.2d 93,410 P.2d 393, 48 
Cal. Rptr. 889 (1966); People of Illinois v. Jones, 329 Ill. App. 503, 69 N.E.2d 522 (4th Dist. 
1946). 
fill Ohio v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1305. 
90 Price I, 562 F. Supp. at 1055. 
9' Id. at 1072. 
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The Georgeoff court had the additional task of determining 
what presumptions apply in considering whether CERCLA 
should be interpreted to impose retroactive liability. Appearing to 
adhere to the notion that retroactive legislation is presumptively 
invalid,92 the court stated: 
. . . concepts of fundamental fairness and the policy of con-
struing statutes to avoid constitutional issues have histori-
cally resulted in a presumption favoring a prospective only 
application of a statute.93 
The court, however, never actually addressed the issue of 
whether the presumption against retroactivity indeed still existed 
by concluding that "even if it were to apply the presumption 
against retroactive application it would find that the presumption 
had been overridden."94 
Finally, the court in Georgeoff considered whether Congress 
had overridden the presumption against applying CERCLA ret-
roactively. The court abided by the following standard frame-
work for analyzing the issue of whether Congress intended a 
particular statute to apply retroactively: 
The Court's analysis must begin with the fundamental rule 
of law that the meaning and intent of a statute is to be 
sought first in the language in which it is framed. If that 
language is plain and unambiguous, then there is no need to 
enlist the rules of interpreta~ion, and the duty of the Court is 
92 See State of Ohio v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1306-08. 
93 [d. at 1306. 
94 [d. at 1307. It should be noted that the presumption against retroactivity has 
arguably been changed to a presumption in its favor. In Bradley v. School Board of the 
City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974), for example, the Supreme Court stated that "a 
court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would 
result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the 
contrary." [d. at 711. The Georgeoff court, while acknowledging the possibility that the 
presumption may indeed have changed to one in favor of retroactive legislation, avoided 
the issue by finding any negative presumption to be overridden in the case of CERCLA. 
See id. at 1307. It is of the author's opinion that even if the court were to apply the 
Bradley standard, retroactive application of CERCLA would still have been permitted. 
First, in light of the tremendous public health objective of the statute, if any 'manifest 
injustice' were to be suffered, it would certainly be by those persons whose health and 
environment were damaged by the improperly disposed waste. Secondly, the legislative 
history of CERCLA reveals a Congressional intent to apply the statute retroactively. See 
infra text and notes at note 102. 
Note also that the Georgeoff court rejected Ohio's attempt to classify CERCLA as a 
remedial statute exempt from a presumption against retroactivity. Ohio v. Georgeoff, 
562 F. Supp. at 1306 n. 7. The author disagrees with the court's holding. See infra text 
and notes at notes 153-61. 
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to enforce the act according to its tenus .... [Where] the 
imperative character necessary to demonstrate retroactive 
intent cannot be assigned to the words of the act, the Court 
must then look at the various indicia of Congressional in-
tent.95 
The court thus began its analysis with an examination of the 
language of CERCLA.96 Because CERCLA contains no explicit 
statements indicating congressional intent to make the statute 
apply retroactively to cleanup costs,91 Ohio pointed to a number of 
CERCLA's provisions and argued for an implied Congressional 
intent to allow a retroactive application of the Act. In particular, 
Ohio attempted to persuade the court to infer congressional in-
tent98 from many of CERCLA's provisions, which are worded in 
the past tense,99 and from the statute's references to "inactive" 
waste disposal sites. Although in disagreement with Ohio as to 
the "past tense-future tense" interpretation, the court did find 
95 Ohio v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1308-09 (quoting, Windsor v. State Farm Insurance 
Co., 509 F. Supp. 342 (D.D.C. 1981». 
96 Ohio, as the party attempting to override the presumption, had the burden of 
persuasion on the issue of legislative intent. [d. at 1309. 
97 [d. There are arguably other provisions which, although unrelated to the concept of 
clean-up costs, by their terms prohibit retroactive application. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611(dX1) 
which provides: "no money in the fund may be used under subsections (cX1) and (2) of 
this section, where the injury, destruction, or loss of natural resources and the release of 
a hazardous substance from which such damages resulted have occurred wholly before 
December 11, 1980." Note, however, that while this provision does appear to expressly 
prohibit retroactivity, the prohibition is limited only to response costs from injuries to 
natural resources and does nothing to limit retroactive application to other types of 
response costs. 
98 As an example of a reference to abandoned facilities, the court cited 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601(2XAXiii) in which the terms "owner or operator" are defined: "in the case of any 
abandoned facility," "any person who owned, operated or otherwise controlled activities 
at such facilities immediately prior to abandonment." 
99 Ohio argued that the wording of § 9607(a), especially subsection (4), which confers 
liability upon "any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for trans-
port to disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by such person, from which there 
is a release ... ," indicates a Congressional intent to apply the liability provisions of 
CERCLA retroactively. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (emphasis added). 
Ohio principally focused upon the terms "accepts or accepted" and "selected" and 
argued that the future tense verb "accepts" refers to liability for post-enactment 
conduct, and the past tense verb "accepted," refers to liability for pre-enactment con-
duct. The court rejected this argument because when applying Ohio construction to 
§ 9607(a)(3), which only contains a past tense verb, the provision would only apply to 
conduct occurring prior to CERCLA's enactment. The court concluded that "a more 
proper view is to read the phrase 'accepts or accepted' from the perspective of the time of 
a release or threatened release, a view supported by the language of § 9607." [d. at 
1309-10. The court similarly found unpersuasive Ohio's identical argument with regard 
to the past tense verb "selected." [d. at 1309-10. 
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these provisions, together with the fact that CERCLA does au-
thorize "reimbursements" for pre-enactment response costs,lOO as 
indicia, but "not dispositive indicia," of congressional intent to 
apply the statute retroactively.lol 
Since the statutory language proved too inconclusive, the court 
turned to an examination of CERCLA's legislative history. Rely-
ing upon congressional statements such as, "I believe the clear 
concensus is that we must clean-up abandoned sites as soon as 
possible,"l02 the court reasoned that CERCLA section 107(a) un-
doubtedly was intended to establish retroactive liability for 
transporters. In order to effectuate this congressional intent, the 
court concluded, the Superfund must be "supplemented by law-
suits which impose retroactive liability upon transporters."103 
With its unprecedented holding that CERCLA section 107 may 
be applied retroactively to hazardous waste transporters, 
Georgeoff appears to be a landmark decision. The court is the first 
to thoroughly sift through the language and history of CERCLA 
and render a judicial determination with regard to the issue of 
retroactivity. Furthermore, the court's analysis of retroactivity 
substantially strengthens the notion that so long as there exists 
some post-enactment activity l04 on the part of the alleged vio-
lators or some continuing harm resulting from any pre-enactment 
activity, non-retroactive liability may be imposed. As such, 
Georgeoff reaffirms the analyses used by previous courts which 
conferred liability upon parties for pre-enactment conduct. lo5 
100 See 42 u.S.C. § 9604(cX3), which prohibits the President from taking "remedial" 
actions unless a cooperative agreement between the President and the unaffected state 
has been entered into and further provides that the affected state under such an 
agreement shall be granted a credit for any documented direct out-of-pocket non-federal 
funds it had expended before CERCLA's enactment. (emphasis added) Note that the 
court's reading of this provision is somewhat incorrect as the provision permits a 
"credit" and does not, as the court so concludes, explicitly permit "reimbursements." 
101 Ohio v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1311. 
102 Id. at 1314, quoting CONG. REC. § 14,973. 
103 State of Ohio v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1313-14. The court rejected the defen-
dant's argument that the 1.6 billion clean-up fund established by CERCLA and the 
section 103 authority to recoup monies used for clean-up were the only remedies pro-
vided for sites pre-dating the statute. Id. at 1313. 
104 As already discussed, the Georgeoff court incorrectly appears to limit post-
enactment activity to "continuing ownership, possession or control." Id. at 1305. See 
supra text and notes at notes 89-91. From the earlier cases, however, it is clear that the 
present threat of harm to human health or environment is sufficient to constitute a 
post-enactment activity. See supra note 67. 
105 See supra note 67. 
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Upon a closer reading of the opinion, however, its impact is 
diminished considerably as the court expressly chose not to ad-
dress the issue of whether such a retroactive application was 
constitutionally valid.106 Part IV of this article will now address 
the NEPACCO decision and the issue of whether CERCLA's 
retroactive application is in fact constitutional. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES To RETROACTIVE 
ApPlJCATION OF CERCLA. 
A. Due Process As a Challenge to CERCLA's Retroactive 
Application. 
As already discussed, there is no express constitutional prohibi-
tion against retroactive civil legislation. Hence, mere retroactivity 
is not sufficient to render a statute invalid.107 The retroactive 
application of CERCLA will only be prohibited if it violates any 
- one of four constitutional protections founded upon notions of due 
process. 
1. The Due Process Clause 
The due process clause of the fifth amendment prohibits Con-
gress from depriving any person of property without due process 
of law. lOB Typically, the retroactive application of CERCLA will be 
the focus of a substantive due process challenge.109 A waste con-
tributor held liable under section 107 for the reimbursement of 
funds expended by the EPA in cleaning up the dump site may 
argue that such liability constitutes a new cause of action for 
previously lawful activities. llo 
The history of substantive due process challenges can best be 
described as circular.111 The 1905 decision of Lochner v. New 
York,112 wherein the Supreme Court invalidated a New York max-
106 The court described the motion as one which "raises issues of statutory construc-
tion, albeit issues which have constitutional overtones." It thus recognized BFl's "re-
served right to advance a constitutional argument at a later date." Id. 
107 Sands, supra note 18, at § 41.03. 
108 See supra note 11. 
I ... See generally CMAISuperfund Study, supra note 56, at Chapter VI, 35-53. 
110 Id. at Chapter VI, 58. Note that if the waste activities were not in fact lawful under 
existing law, then this constitutionality argument is effectively destroyed. See infra text 
and notes at notes 150-61. 
111 See generally, NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 61, at 449. 
112 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
! .. 
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imum hours law for bakers, represented the start of the substan-
tive due process explosion which resulted in an era of strict judi-
cial scrutiny of economic legislation. In the mid-1930's, however, 
judicial intervention in economic legislation began to taper off. 
Today, the use of substantive due process to protect economic and 
property rights is almost non-existent, and the judiciary has con-
tinually deferred to the decision-making of the other branches of 
government. In the majority of its opinions, the Supreme Court 
has continued to adhere to a "rational basis" test in reviewing the 
substance of laws and regulations challenged under the due pro-
cess clause.113 
The NEPACCO court is the first to render a decision with 
regard to whether the retroactive application of CERCLA is con-
stitutional under the due process clause.114 In that case, the 
United States sought injunctive relief and reimbursement of all 
costs it had incurred in performing remedial and removal actions 
at the "Denny Farm" waste disposal site ("waste site") near Vero-
na, Missouri. 115 The complaint, brought pursuant to section 7003 
of RCRA and sections 104, 106(a) and 107(a) of CERCLA, was flIed 
against NEPACCO, the waste generator, and against both waste 
disposal operators and waste transporters.116 In 1971, the 
NEPACCO waste products, which included dioxin and toluene,117 
113 NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 61, at 449. 
114 One month after the NEPACCO decision, the United States District Court of South 
Carolina was faced with a retroactivity challenge against CERCLA section 107 in the 
case of United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., No. 80-1274-6, 14 
ENVTL. L. REP. 20272 (D.S.C. Feb. 23, 1984). That court held that CERCLA need not be 
applied retroactively because it is a remedial statute. I d. at 20276. For a full discussion of 
that case and its holding that CERCLA is a remedial statute, 8ee infra text and notes at 
notes 162-67. In the alternative, the court held that even if CERCLA is applied retroac-
tively, it would not violate the due process clause.ld. at 20272-77. See infra note 133. 
115 NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 828. 
116 Id. at 827. 
117 Both toluene and dioxin are infamously dangerous chemicals. Acute exposure to 
toluene predominantly results in central nervous system depression. Symptoms and 
signs include headache, dizziness, fatigue, muscular weakness, drowsiness, uncoordina-
tion with staggering gait, skin parsthesias, collapse and coma. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALm, 
EDUCATION AND WELFARE, OcCUPATIONAL DISEASES. A GUIDE To THEIR RECOGNlTION 
(1977). 
Dioxin has been the subject of numerous cases involving hazardous waste sites. For 
example, in United States v. Vertac Chemical Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980) the 
court stated: 
It is undisputed that dioxin is the most acutely toxic substance yet synthesized 
by man. The acute toxicity of dioxin (i.e., the effects of repeated, low level 
exposure over a long period of time) ... has been the subject oflengthy scientific 
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were loaded into approximately eighty-five drums, the majority of 
which were corroded, and transported to the waste site. Upon 
arrival at the waste site the drums were deposited in a large 
trench which was then excavated and plowed over with soil. The 
hazardous contaminants subsequently leached down into the 
groundwater below the trench and migrated into the area's 
springs and wells. 118 
The NEPACCO defendants argued, inter alia,119 that the ret-
debate and . . . [t]here is evidence that dioxin has produced mutagenic, 
teratogenic, fetoxic and possible carcinogenic results in low dose levels in vari-
ous laboratory animals and cell culture tests ... [n]o level of dioxin exposure 
other than zero, had been proven to be safe. 
llB NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 833. 
llS The NEPACCO court also rendered a decision with regard to the following other 
important issues: First, the court considered whether section 7003 of RCRA applied 
retroactively to hold past non-negligent off-site generators and transporters liable for 
the costs incurred in the clean-up of an inactive or abandoned hazardous waste disposal 
site. After a "thorough review and analysis of the statutory language, case law and 
legislative history," the NEPACCO court held that section 7003 does not apply retroac-
tively. In particular, the NEPACCO court followed the opinions of United States v. 
Waste Industries, 556 F. Supp. at 1303-14, and Wade 1,546 F. Supp. at 785. For the court's 
full discussion of the issue see NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 839-43. 
Second, the NEP ACCO court had to determine whether strict liability was the stan-
dard to be applied in determining liability under CERCLA. In answering this question in 
the affirmative, the court relied upon CERCLA's legislative history and statutory provi-
sions. Specifically, the court looked at section 101(32), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32), CERCLA's 
definitional section which states: "liable or liability under this chapter shall be construed 
to be the standard of liability which obtains under [section 311 of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) ... 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1981)]." The NEPACCO court held 
that because "[t]he courts have consistently construed § 1321 as a strict liability provi-
sion," CERCLA's liability provisions also should provide for such a standard. See 
NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 843-44. 
A third issue included in the NEPACCO case was whether CERCLA provided for the 
imposition of joint and several liability. The court held that indeed CERCLA did provide 
for such joint and several liability. However, the court did not determine whether the 
specific standard was to be found in section 311 of the FWPCA or in the common law of 
the states. 
ld. at 844-45. The court's rationale was as follows: 
Granted this issue may be of pinnacle importance in cases involving numerous 
generators, transporters, site owners and a different state's law; however, the 
Court deems it unnecessary to address this issue under the facts of the case at 
bar, which involve one generator, one transporter and one landowner in the 
State of Missouri. The Court concludes that the imminent and substantial 
endangerment posed by the Denney farm site was the act of the defendants 
working in concert to produce a single indivisible harm and they are therefore 
jointly and severally liable for the response costs incurred by the plaintiff, and 
for which plaintiff is entitled to recover. Under this finding, the defendants 
would be jointly and severally liable pursuant to the law of Missouri.ld. at 845. 
The NEPACCO court's final task was to determine the response costs for which the 
defendants were liable under sections 104, 106(a), and 107(a). The defendants first argued 
i .... 
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roactive imposition of liability pursuant to CERCLA sections 104, 
106(a) and 107(a) constituted a violation of the fifth amendment of 
the due process clause. Disagreeing with this argument, the court 
followed the analysis of Georgeoff. l20 The court began its analysis 
with the presumption that "legislation is [to] apply prospectively 
and that it is the plaintiff's burden of proof to show that the 
statute is to be given a retroactive effect."121 Relying principally 
upon Georgeoff122 and its review of CERCLA's legislative history, 
the court concluded that sections 104 and 107(a) were undoubt-
edly intended to apply retroactively.l23 The court stated: 
A brief review of the case law and legislative history clearly 
supports this proposition. It was the precise inadequacies 
resulting from RCRA's lack of applicability to inactive and 
abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites that prompted the 
passage of CERCLA.l24 
In addition to reaffirming Congress' intent to apply sections 104 
and 107(a) retroactively, the NEPACCO court considered the 
novel issue125 of whether section 106(a), CERCLA's "imminent 
hazard" provision could be applied retroactively to inactive or 
that the plaintiff failed to prove that the costs incurred were reasonable and were "not 
consistent with the National Contingency Plan." Id. at 850. The court placed the burden 
of proving such an inconsistency on the defendants. The defendants failed to meet this 
burden of proof and the court thus held that response costs were recoverable. Id. at 851. 
The defendants then alleged that the government could not recover pre-enactment 
response costs. With this allegation the court agreed and hence the government was able 
to recover all of its response costs which were incurred after December 10, 1980.Id. at 
850-52. 
120 See 'supra text and notes at notes 75-106 for discussion of the Georgeoff case 
analysis. 
121 Id. at 839. 
122 NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 839. The Court also cited as support: U.S. v. Waste 
Industries, 556 F. Supp. at 1316-17; Wade I, 546 F. Supp. at 792-93; Stepan Chemical Co., 
544 F. Supp. at 1140-41. 
123 NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 839. 
124 Id. 
123 The issue whether section 106(a) can be applied retroactively has only been ad-
dressed by one other court. See Wade 1546 F. Supp at 792-94. See also text and notes at 
notes 51-55. Note that the government took heed of the Wade I opinion and in 1983 again 
brought suit against the defendants, but in that subsequent action, the claim was based 
upon CERCLA section 107. In United States v. Wade (Wade II), 579 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. 
Pa. 1983), the court upheld generator liability under sections 104 and 107 and imposed a 
minimal burden of causation. See infra text and notes at notes 184-85 for 8., discussion of 
the effect of that ruling in the context of retroactivity. Note, however, that the court did 
not readdress the issues of retroactive liability under section 7003 and section 106. 
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abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites.126 The court, relying 
upon precedent and the Act's legislative history, provided the 
following analysis: 
Although the statutory language does not explicitly refer to 
inactive sites, Congress made this explicitly clear. The Court 
finds that section 106(a) applies to inactive sites and that the 
same persons listed as liable under section 107(a) are liable 
under section 106(a). To read sections 104, 106(a) and 107(a) 
otherwise would be to emasculate the purpose of CERCLA 
and the intent of Congress. 127 
After reaching these threshhold conclusions, the court ad-
dressed whether the retroactive application of CERCLA was in 
violation of the fifth amendment of the due process clause. The 
NEPACCO court, like many other courts faced with retroactivity 
challenges, relied extensively upon Usury v. Turner Elkhorn Min-
ing CO.I28 (Turner Elkhorn). There, the Supreme Court upheld a 
statutel29 which imposed liability upon coal industry employers to 
compensate former employees disabled from black lung di~ease. 
The employers argued that the statute violated the due process 
clause as it obligated them to compensate employees who had 
terminated their employment prior to the effective date of the 
Act. The Supreme Court concluded that due process was satisfied 
because the legislation represented "a rational measure to spread 
the costs of the employee's disabilities to those who have profited 
from the fruits of their labor."l30 
According to Turner Elkhorn, the parties complaining of a due 
process violation bear the heavy burden of establishing "that the 
legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way."131 The 
118 [d. 
127 NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp at 839. See also U.S. v. Diamond Shamrock, 12 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 20819. Note that in U.S. v. Diamond Shamrock the court did not have to address the 
retroactivity issue because the plaintiffs successfully alleged continuing post-enactment 
damages. The NEPACCO court also relied upon the legislative history of section 106. 
NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 839 n.16, citing H. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28, 
reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, 6130-6131. 
128 Usury V. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976). See Comment, Generator 
Liability, supra note 30, at 1246-50. 
128 Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 83 stat. 792, as 
amended by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1872,30 U.S.C. §§ 901-950. 
130 Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 18. 
131 [d. But see CMAISuperfund Study, supra note 56, at Chapter VI-40 wherein the 
authors interpret the case to hold that a greater justification is required for retroactive 
measures. 
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NEPACCO court applied this "rational means" test and held that 
CERCLA's "imposition of liability for past acts is rational and 
satisfies the due process clause of the fifth amendment."132 The 
court justified this holding by stating: 
It is clear that Congress intended to have the chemical indus-
try, past and present, pay for costs of cleaning up inactive 
hazardous waste sites ... Congress rationally considered the 
imposition of liability for the effects of past disposal practices 
as a means to spread the costs of the clean-up on those who 
created and profited from the waste disposal-generators, 
transporters and disposal site owners/operators. (emphasis 
added) 133 
Although the court based its decision upon a rational-means 
standard, it did not set forth any assessment of that standard's 
components. In order to fully justify CERCLA's constitutionality 
pursuant to a rational-means test a discussion of the factors used 
by the Supreme Court to determine "rationality" is warranted. 
The factors relevant to a judicial assessment of rationality, as 
distilled from Turner Elklwrn and other Supreme Court deci-
sions, were set forth in Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corp. 134 At issue in Nachman was the constitutionality 
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act l35 which re-
quired employers to pay pension benefits to all workers presently 
in their employ as well as to those workers who had terminated 
employment in the year prior to enactment. l36 After assessing the 
rationality of the retroactive provisions, the court concluded that 
132 NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 841. 
133 [d. at 840-41. The court in South Carolina Recycling used virtually identical analy-
sis in reaching the conclusion that even if CERCLA section 107 were considered retroac-
tive it would satisfy the requirements of due process. South Carolina Recycling, 14 
ENVTL. L. REP. at 20276. Like the NEPACCO court, the South Carolina Recycling court 
justified this holding by stating: 
To the extent the CERCLA is considered retroactive, it clearly satisfies the 
Turner Elkhorn standard. Like the statute at issue in Turner Elkorn, CERCLA 
was enacted in response to the threat perceived by Congress to be caused by 
inactive and abandoned hazardous waste sites .... An overriding objective in 
enacting CERCLA [sic] to spread the economic costs of cleanup operations 
among 'those responsible for any damage, environmental harm, or injury [re-
sulting from] chemical poisons ... .' 
The liability scheme established under CERCLA is clearly a rational means of achieving 
this objective. [d. at 20277. 
134 Nachman Corp., 592 F.2d at 947. 
135 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144 (Supp. 
1981). 
136 Nachman Corp., 592 F.2d at 950. 
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the statute satisfies due process.137 In that court's opinion, "ra-
tionality must be determined by a comparison of the problem to 
be remedied with the nature and scope of the burden imposed to 
remedy that problem."l38 In evaluating the nature and scope of 
the burden, the Nachman court considered the following factors: 
(1) the reliance interests of the parties affected;139 
(2) whether the impairment of the private interest is effected 
in an area previously subjected to regulatory control;140 
(3) the equities of imposing the legislative burdens;141 and 
(4) the inclusion of statutory provisions designed to limit and 
moderate the impact of the burdens.142 
Although not listed by the Nachman court, an additional factor to 
consider in determining rationality is, as stressed in Turner Elk-
horn, the causal nexus between the legislative justification and 
the persons upon which retroactive liability is imposed. l43 The 
following application of these factors to the liability provisions of 
CERCLA indicates that the Act satisfies due process. 
First, an analysis of the reliance interests of the parties affected 
suggests that the success or failure of that argument is a function 
of the degree of reliance.l44 In Turner Elkhorn, for example, the 
Court rejected the reliance interests argument as the mine em-
ployers had "not specifically pressed the contention that they 
would have taken steps to reduce or eliminate the incidence of 
[black lung disease] had the law imposed liability upon them."!45 
Hence, opponents of CERCLA must allege that their reliance 
interests were substantial. A party who is able to demonstrate 
that they predicated their decision-making, especially those deci-
sions involving great expense, upon prior law is in a better posi-
tion to challenge CERCLA than a party without such proof. For 
example, a disposal facility owner may argue that they expended 
137 ld. at 960. 
138 Id. 
138 Id., citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); Adams 
Nursing Home of Williamstown, Inc. v. Mathews, 548 F.2d 1077, 1080-81 (1st Cir. 1977). 
140 Supra note 136 citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 234; 
Federal Housing Administration v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958). 
141 Supra note 136 citing Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad, 295 U.S. 330, 
354 (1935); Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 19. 
142 Id. 
143 Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 19-20. 
144 Id. at 17. See also CMAlSuperfund Study, supra note 56, at Chapter VI-49. 
145 TUrner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 17. 
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considerable time and money so that their facilities and treat-
ment methodologies would meet the standards required by RCRA 
section 6924.146 Moreover, if generators would have known that 
they would later be held liable for the disposal of waste, they 
perhaps would have found another viable method of waste dis-
posal.147 
These arguments, however, lose much of their persuasiveness 
when the impairment of the public's interest is considered. In-
deed, the public's reliance interests upon both the government 
and the private sector far outweigh the vast contributor's reliance 
on prior law. While the government protects the public from 
activities which pose a threat to their health and the welfare of 
their environment, the private sector is expected to minimize the 
risks associated with their production activities. l48 This sort of 
balancing is a common method of determining a retroactive stat-
ute's constitutionality. As one commentator has stated: 
Much legislation adjusts the heights of private groups in an 
attempt to achieve a balance which best serves the 'public 
purpose,' and many such statutes have been upheld against 
claims that their retrospective operation was a denial of due 
process.149 
A second consideration supporting the rationality of imposing 
CERCLA retroactively is that the hazardous waste area is one 
which was previously subject to both federal and state regulatory 
control.l50 This contention raises an interesting proposition with 
regard to CERCLA's constitutionality. It is arguable that 
CERCLA was enacted merely as a remedial statute and there-
fore, based upon that fact alone, its retroactive application may be 
sustained.151 Remedial statutes are enacted to remove " ... unin-
146 42 U.S.C. § 6924. The regulations promulgated pursuant to this section are codified 
at 40 C.F.R pt. 122.1 et seq. See also, CMAJSuperfund Study, supra note 56, at Chapter 
VI-64, wherein the authors also cite section 402(a) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1342(a), which required generators to expend considerable amounts of money to up-
grade pits, ponds and lagoons used for waste disposal. It is argued that forcing these 
generators to remove the wastes pursuant to Superfund severely impairs reliance 
interests. 
147 See ld. at Chapter VI-64. See also, Nachman Corp., 592 F.2d at 961. 
146 See Nachman Corp., 592 F.2d at 962. 
149 Hochman, supra note 58, at 698. 
150 See supra text and notes at notes 19-31. See also Nachman Corp., 592 F.2d at 962. 
151 See generally NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 61, at 473; Sands, supra 
note 19, at § 41.04; Hochman, supra note 58, at 703-06. 
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tended flaws in existing legislation and help give full effect to the 
legislative intent behind the initial legislation."l52 
This argument was raised, unsuccessfully, by both Ohio and the 
Justice Department in Georgeoff. Ohio sought to bring CERCLA 
within the class of remedial statutes and cited a number of cases 
in support of its conclusion. l53 The court quickly rejected this 
argument, stating: 
Acknowledging that 'while the distinction between remedial 
and substantive legislation is rather uncertain ... [a] reme-
dial statute is generally defined as one which neither en-
larges nor impairs substantive rights, but rather relates to 
the means and procedure for enforcing those rights. It can 
hardly be contended, however, that this statute involves re-
medial legislation of this type. CERCLA creates an entirely 
new procedure for enforcing substantive rights-a procedure 
which was the purpose for enacting the statute. 1M 
Similarly, Justice asserted that environmental statutes, which 
were designed to remedy continuing threats and injuries to public 
health, were subject to a different definition of "remedial."l55 In 
support of its contention, Justice cited Diamond Shamrock l56 "as 
authority for the view that the generous construction required by 
law for statutes relating to water pollution allows a retroactive 
application of CERCLA."157 The court, however, distingushed that 
case: "The principal thrust of Diamond Shamrock is to give a 
generous construction to the definitional terms of the statute, not 
the issue of retroactivity."l58 
152 NowAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 61, at 473. See also Ohio v. Georgeoff, 
562 F. Supp. at 1306 n. 7, wherein the court defined remedial legislation as that which 
"neither enlarges nor impairs substantive rights, but rather relates to the means and 
procedure for enforcing those rights." 
See, e.g., F.H.A. v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. at 84, wherein the Supreme Court 
sustained a retrospective reading of an amendment to the Veteran Emergency Housing 
Act of 1946. The Court stated that: 
Federal regulation of future action based upon rights previously acquired by the 
person regulated is not prohibited by the Constitution. So long as the Constitu-
tion authorizes the subsequently enacted legislation, the fact that its provisions 
limit or interfere with previously acquired rights does not condemn it. Id. 
(quoting, Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 107 (1947». 
153 Ohio v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1306 n.7. 
154 Id. at 1305-06 n.7. 
155 Id. at 1307. 
158 U.S. v. Diamond Shamrock, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. at 20819. 
157 Ohio v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1307. 
158 Id. 
1985] APPLICATION OF SUPERFUND 29 
It is unfortunate that neither Justice nor Ohio utilized 
CERCLA's legislative history in support of their arguments.l59 
Included in the pre-enactment hearings were discussions regard-
ing the Act's remedial nature. In the Senate Hearings, for exam-
ple, Thomas Jorling, the Assistant Administrator in EPA's Water 
and Waste Management Division, stated: 
In addition to creating the fund, the other main goal of the 
legislation originally was to clarify and codify long-standing 
common law theories as they relate to liability for damages 
caused by hazardous waste disposal activities. 160 
Similarly, with regard to the inadequacies of the Clean Water Act 
in addressing chemical spills, former EPA Administrator Douglas 
Costle stated: 
The Administration's proposal does not duplicate existing 
laws with regard to chemical spills; it incorporates and ex-
pands upon them. This expansion is necessary because-and 
this applies to oil spills as well as chemical spills-Section 311 
of the Clean Water Act, the existing law does not authorize 
government action for spills onto the ground only, or spills 
that result only in the release of gases into the air. It also 
does not adequately cover spills that contaminate only 
groundwater. 
. . . the liability provisions of Superfund are not retroac-
tive at all. They merely codify longstanding common law rules 
relating to liability for hazardous products and undertakings. 
Existing common law principles hold that in areas of ultra-
hazardous activity, liability is attached to any injury resulting 
directly or indirectly from the activity. This is true regardless 
of whether the injury was foreseeable or whether negligence 
or contributory negligence was involved. (emphasis added)161 
CERCLA's legislative history suggests that the statute is reme-
dial in nature as it was intended by Congress to alleviate the 
inadequacies in existing legislation. Indeed, rather than creating 
a new procedure for enforcing substantive rights, CERCLA 
merely codifies the existing standards for waste management. 
This conclusion was reached by the United States District 
159 Note that for purposes of statutory construction the most persuasive, although not 
decisive, sources for determining legislative intent are reports of standing committees. 
Sands, supra note 18, at § 480.06. The quotations cited in this article are of statements 
made at committee hearings whieh are less often relied upon by the courts in determin-
ing the intent of the legislature. [d. at § 48.10. 
100 Hearings, supra note 40, at 93. 
161 Letter from EPA Administrator Douglas Costle to Hon. Jennings Randolph, in S. 
REP. No. 848, 96th Congo 2d Sess. 100. (hereinafter cited as Costle letter) 
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Court of South Carolina in United States v. South Carolina Re-
cycling and Disposal, Inc. l62 (South Carolina Recycling). In that 
case, the United States instituted an action pursuant to CERCLA 
section 107, to recover costs of removing hazardous wastes from 
the surface of the Bluff Road hazardous waste site, located near 
Columbia, South Carolina. The named defendants were four 
hazardous waste generators, the two waste-site property owners, 
a lessee of a portion of the dump site, and the site operator. l63 
The disposal site and property was used by the various defen~ 
dants from 1972 to 1978. During the course of the dumping opera-
tions, 
an environmental hazard of staggering proportions devel-
oped. Some 7,200 fifty-five gallon drums of hazardous sub-
stances, including materials which are toxic, carcinogenic, 
mutagenic, explosive, and highly flammable, accumulated at 
the site. The drums were randomly and haphazardly stacked 
upon one another without regard to their source or the com-
patibility of the substances within. Many drums deteriorated 
to the point that their hazardous contents were leaking and 
oozing onto the ground and onto other drums. The exposure 
of these substances to the elements, as well as to other sub-
stances with which they comingled, caused a number of fires 
and explosions and generated noxious and toxic fumes. l64 
Based upon these conditions, the EPA entered into an agree-
ment with twelve waste generators and one transporter to per-
form remedial activities. The EPA used the Superfund to finance 
the cleanup of twenty-five percent of the site's surface. Cleanup 
of the remaining seventy-five percent was undertaken by the 
aforementioned defendants.1OO The EPA subsequently brought 
suit under section 107 to recover costs associated with its cleanup 
activities at the site. 
The South Carolina Recycling defendants challenged the sec-
tion 107 claim arguing that CERCLA was impermissibly retroac-
tive and as such was in violation of due process.l66 The court 
rejected this challenge, reasoning that CERCLA section 107 was 
intended to be a remedial statute. In particular, the court stated: 
162 South Carolina Recycling, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. at 20272-77. See supra text and notes 
at notes 14, 133. 
163 ld. at 20273. 
164 ld. at 20274 
165 ld. 
166 I d. at 20276. 
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Although liability under CERCLA is premised in part upon 
conduct which occurred prior to CERCLA's enactment in 
1980, this court does not consider CERCLA 'retroactive' in 
the constitutional sense as applied to the facts of this case, 
The plain language of [S]ection 107 of CERCLA makes it 
quite clear that CERCLA is a broad remedial statute prem-
ised upon present and future effects of defendants' past 
actions-a 'release' or a 'threatened release' of a hazardous 
substance must occur before any liability attaches, 167 
31 
Applying CERCLA to the facts of that case, the South Carolina 
Recycling court held the statute to be remedial and hence non-
retroactive, 
The third consideration, relevant to the determination of 
whether the burden of such liability is irrational,l68 is the basic 
equities of imposing retroactive liability, In particular, the ques-
tion becomes one of which party should bear the costs of the 
necessary remedial action, 169 
This was the only factor considered by NEPACCO in the as-
sessment of the rationality of CERCLA's retroactive applica-
tion,170 As already discussed, the NEPACCO court's determina-
tion that CERCLA was a rational cost-spreading mechanism was 
based solely upon Turner Elkhorn, With regard to this issue in 
that case, the mine employers argued that the Black Lung Act's 
cost spreading mechanism was "arbitrary and irrational" as it 
[67 Id, The South Carolina Recycling court relied extensively upon the decisions under 
RCRA section 7003 stating: 
Courts interpreting [s]ection 7003 have held that it is not 'retroactive' in nature 
because its objective is to obtain relief to abate current and future hazardous 
conditions, notwithstanding the fact that the conditions might be attributable to 
past acts, Id, 
The court specifically relied upon United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. at 1071-72 and 
United States v. Diamond Shamrock Co., 12 ENVTL. L. REP. at 20819. Note, however, that 
the courts in these cases focused their attention not so much upon the remedial nature of 
the RCRA, but rather upon the fact that post-enactment damages existed or threatened 
to exist. See supra text and notes at note 67. See also text and notes at notes 67 and 89-91 
for the Georgeoff court's discussion of this distinction between pre-enactment and post-
enactment damages. 
Note that the South Carolina Recycling court did, in the alternative, turn to a discus-
sion of CERCLA's constitutionality. It held that even if CERCLA was considered ret-
roactive it would clearly satisfy the requirements of due process. South Carolina Recy-
cling, 14 ENVTL. L. REP., at 20276-44. See supra note 133 for a full discussion of that issue. 
[68 Nachman Corp., 592 F.2d at 962. 
[69 See generally Comment, Generator Liability, supra note 30, at 1249-50. 
[70 NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 840-41. See also supra text and notes at notes 132-33. See 
also South Carolina Recycling, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. at 20276-77. For a discussion of that 
court's holding on this issue, see supra note 133. 
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imposed a disproportionately heavy financial burden upon those 
operators whose former employees had contracted black lung 
disease. The employers alleged that a more fair and rational 
method would consist of a tax upon all present coal mine 
operators. l71 The Supreme Court rejected this argument and 
stated: 
. . . it was reasonable for Congress to conclude that this 
liability represented "an actual, measurable cost of ... the 
[employer's] business." ... it is enough to say that the Act 
approaches the problem of cost-spreading rationally; whether 
a broader cost-spreading scheme would have been wiser or 
more practical under the circumstances is not a question of 
constitutional dimension . (emphasis added)172 
Applying the Supreme Court's analysis to CERCLA, the 
NEPACCO court concluded that the Act's taxing mechanism and 
liability provisions were a rational cost-spreading scheme. 
There are a number of theories which lend support to the 
NEPACCO court's decision. First, pursuant to section 107 the 
government may recoup cleanup costs from those parties who, 
whether remotely so or not, bore some connection to the aban-
doned waste site. As correctly observed by one commentator, 
"imposing liability for dump site clean-up on past waste 
generators ... may be more rational than holding all chemical 
companies ... responsible [when they] may have no connection 
whatsoever to the condition."173 This conclusion gains support 
from CERCLA's legislative history. As an Environment and Pub-
lic Works Committee member stated: 
it is wholly appropriate and equitable for the industries 
which have benefited most directly from cheap, inadequate 
disposal practices, and which have generated the wastes 
which imposed the risks on society to contribute a substantial 
portion of the response costs. Both the Commerce Committee 
and Ways and Means Committee agree on this principle.174 
Similarly, in response to challenges made by the Chemical Man-
ufacturers Association, Douglas Costle commented: 
... in terms of equity, the Administration believes that it is 
less fair for the general taxpayer to bear this financial re-
sponsibility than it is for consumers who benefit from the 
171 Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 18. 
172 I d. at 19. 
173 Comment, Generator Liability, supra note 30, at 1250. 
174 Hearings, supra note 40, at 229. 
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commerce of hazardous substances to do so. Too often the 
general taxpayer is asked to pick up the tab for problems he 
or she did not create. Using special fees to differentiate be-
tween the general public and those who benefit from specific 
commercial and industrial practices is widely accepted, not 
only in our society but throughout the world, and should be 
used in this case. i75 
33 
In addition, under the CERCLA taxing mechanisms the costs are 
equally passed on to all industrial sectors generating hazardous 
substances and wastes. I76 It was reasonable, therefore, for the 
NEPACCO court to conclude that CERCLA's liability and taxing 
systems constitute rational and equitable cost-spreading mecha-
nIsms. 
The last consideration set forth in Nachman is whether there 
exists a Congressional attempt to moderate the impact of the lia-
bility imposed.177 When applying this consideration to CERCLA, 
it is apparent that any challenge to the Act's retroactive im-
position of liability must fail. Congress provided both explicit 
and implicit limitations on a waste contributer's potential lia-
bility. First, the strict liability I78 standard under section 107 is 
subject to defenses of acts of God, acts of war, and certain acts or 
omissions of third parties. 179' Second, limitations on liability are set 
forth in section 107(c). These limitations are inapplicable, how-
ever, where the pollutor fails to cooperate in the cleanup efforts, 
where knowing violation of certain regulations is the primary 
cause of the pollution, or where willful negligence or misconduct 
has occurred. ISO Finally, section 107(e)(lX2)I8I of the Act preserves 
a generator's right to seek indemnification from the transporter 
in a separate cause of action. 
175 Costle letter, supra note 161, at 102. 
176 Id. 
177 Nachman Corp., 592 F.2d at 962. 
178 While the term "strict liability" is not used in the Act, CERCLA indirectly provides 
for the standard of liability by failing to incorporate any defense based upon the exercise 
of due care. See generally Trauberman, Supetfund at Square One: Promising Statutory 
Framework Requires Forceful EPA Implementation, 11 ENVTL. L. REP. 10101 (ENVTL. L. 
INST. 1981). See also City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. at 1140; 
South Carolina Recycling, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. at 20274-75. But see CMAISuperfund Study, 
supra note 56, at Chapter II. 
179 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). See generally Mott, supra note 5; Hinds, supra note 5, at 27-28. 
See also, U.S. v. Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1100; City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical 
Co., 544 F. Supp. at 1135. 
1110 Id. at § 9607(c)(3). 
lal 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1)-(2). See infra text and note at note 221. 
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Despite these defenses to and limitations upon liability, some 
commentators have argued that the government's persistence in 
asserting joint and several liability l82 against all defendants sig-
nificantly increases the inequities of retroactive liability. In many 
such cases, it is argued, a number of the defendants have either 
settled or are insolvent and hence the remaining defendants must 
shoulder all of the costs of liability. 183 This argument, while at one 
time a potentially strong challenge to retroactive liability, is cur-
rently of little force. Recently, a number of separate federal dis-
trict courts decided that users of a hazardous waste disposal site 
are jointly and severally liable to the government for reimburse-
ment of the cleanup expenses unless the individual user can prove 
both that the harm is divisible and that it is responsible only for a 
portion of that harm.l84 
The courts; therefore, have applied a most equitable remedy. 
This method of imposing joint and several liability removes the 
impossible burden of isolating a particular waste ~nd proving that 
a particular generator's wastes were released, and yet it also 
leaves a generator with the ability to absolve itself from liabil-
ity for all costs of the remedial activities, provided it can prove 
its pro-rata contribution. l85 This less harsh interpretation of 
182 The issue of joint and several liability under CERCLA has been the subject of 
discussion in many law review articles and other publications. See generally Joint and 
Several Liability for Hazardous Waste Releases Under Superfund, 68 VA. L. REV. 1157 
(1982); Manatt Study, supra note 5, at Chapter IV, 213-18 (includes an excellent overview 
of joint and several liability under California law); Gulick, Superfund: Conscripting 
Industry Support for Environmental Cleanup, 9 EcOLOGY L. Q. 524, 544-47; Comment, 
Generator Liability, supra note 30, at 1265-78. 
Hinds, supra note 28, at 26-27; Miller, Defending Superfund and RCRA Imminent 
Hazard Cases, 15 NAT. RESOURCES LAW 483, 489-92; Comment, Unearthing Defendants 
in Toxic Waste Litigation: Problems of Liability and I dentijication, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
891 (1982); Rogers, The Generators' Dilemma in Superfund Cases, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. 
15049 (ENVTL. L. INST. 1982). See also Liability, Apportionment and Burden of Proof: Key 
Legal Issues in Superfund Suits, 14 ENVTL. RPTR. 440 (BNA); Government Responds to 
Industry Challenges to Joint and Several Liability Under Superfund, 14 ENVTL. RPTR. 
138 (BNA). 
183 See CMAISuperfund Study, supra note 56, at Chapter VI-62. 
184 See United States v. Chem Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Wade II, 579 F. 
Supp. at 1331-34; United States v. A. & F. Materials Co., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1252-57 
(S.D. Ill. 1984); South Carolina Recycling, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. at 20275-76; But see United 
States v. Stringfellow, No. CV-83-2501-MML, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 20385 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 
1984) (Joint and several liability under CERCLA section 107 permitted, but not required. 
No joint and several liability under CERCLA section 106, RCRA section 7003, Clean 
Water Act section 504, or SDWA section 1431). 
185 See Miller, supra note 182, at 491-92. 
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CERCLA has given defendants the opportunity to limit, if not 
eliminate, their individual liabilities. ' 
In addition to the Nachman considerations already discussed, 
opponents of retroactive liability under CERCLA rely on Turner 
Elkhorn when arguing that the government must establish an 
adequate causal connection between the past actions of the waste 
contributors and the rationale for imposing retroactive liability.l86 
It is argued that in Turner Elkhorn, the Supreme Court based its 
decision to uphold the retroactive application of the Black Lung 
Statute, in part, on the strong causal connection between the 
mine operators and the dangerous conditions causing black lung 
disease. 187 The court held that "the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause poses 
no bar to requiring an operator to provide compensation for a 
former employee's death or disability due to pneumoconiosis aris-
ing out of employment in its mines."l88 Waste contributors, par-
ticulary waste generators, may thus argue that there is not a 
sufficient causal nexus between their generation activities and 
the damages caused by the subsequent dumping of that waste. It 
can be further argued that many times not all wastes at a site 
were improperly disposed of and thus, without proof that their 
particular waste was that which eventually leaked, the generator 
cannot be held liable. 
These arguments, like those under joint and several liability, 
have been severely weakened by the recent court decision of 
United States v. Wade 189 (Wade II). In an unprecedented interpre-
tation of CERCLA, the court rejected the generators' argument 
that in order to establish liability the government must prove not 
only a causal nexus between costs incurred in clean-up and a 
given generator's waste but also that a particular generator's 
actual waste is presently at the site and has been the subject of a 
removal or remedial measure.Hj() The court ruled that CERCLA 
section 107 imposes liability on generators upon a showing that 
(1) they merely disposed of hazardous waste in the facility in 
question; (2) wastes of the type disposed of are now in the site; 
(3) there is a release of any hazardous substance; and (4) that 
186 See CMNSuperfund Study, supra note 56, at Chapter VI-60. 
187 Id. at Chapter VI-41 n. 62. 
188 Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 19-20. 
189 Wade II, 579 F. Supp. at 1337-39. See also South Carolina Recycling, 14 ENVTL. L. 
REP. at 20274-75. 
100 I d. at 1331. 
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plaintiff has incurred response costs pursuant to CERCLA 191 
Hence, the court's broad reading of section 107 imposing a mini-
mal burden of proof of causation upon the government certainly 
obliterates any generator optimism for a narrow standard of 
liability under that provision. , 
In light of the above discussion, this Comment concludes that a 
retroactive application of CERCLA's liability provisions satisfies 
due process. First, because CERCLA primarily allows new reme-
dies for activities recognized by previous common and statutory 
law as tortious, it may be classified as a remedial statute and, as 
such, would not be subject to any limitations upon its retrospec-
tive application. This argument, however, would not be a valid 
one if the pre-enactment activities were lawful under pre-existing 
regulations. In its alternative, therefore, it may be argued that in 
light of the additional factors considered it is obvious that any 
impairment of due process on the part of the defendants is out-
weighed by the benefits such retroactive liability would confer to 
public health and safety.l92 
2. The Contract Clause 
The United States Constitution contains an unqualified 
guarantee that the states shall not impair any obligation of con-
tracts. l93 In the case of the federal government, while there is no 
such express prohibition in the United States Constitution 
against impairment of contract obligations by federal law, the 
same protections apply by force of the due process clause in the 
191 Note that the court in Wade II also ruled that limits on government response 
actions under section 104 do not limit generator liability under section 107. The court 
also discussed the issue of whether the government might be able to recover costs not 
yet incurred but postponed ruling on this issue until a determination of the full amount 
of reimbursable response costs already incurred. See Id. at 1338. Third, the court con-
cluded that Congress intended that the courts apply common law principles in determin-
ing the scope of liability under CERCLA. Id. at 1338. 
192 These conclusions were recently upheld in State Department of Environmental 
Protection v. Ventron Corp., 440 A.2d at 455. In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
upheld the retroactive liability provision of that state's own "Superfund." The Court held 
that because the defendants' pre-enactment actions were in violation of the laws preced-
ing the current Spill Act, the latter was merely a remedial statute. I d. at 460. In addition, 
the Court stated: 
Although retroactive application of a statute may impair private property 
rights, when protection of the public interest so clearly predominates over the 
impairment, the statute is valid. In this case, we find that the public interest 
outweighs any impairment of private property rights. 13 ENVTL. L. REP. at 20837. 
193 See supra note 12. 
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fifth amendment. l94 In any case, the protection against retroac-
tive impairment of contract rights is subject to the same consid-
erations which are applied in determining the legality of retroac-
tive impairment of non-contract rights, under the due process 
clauses.l95 Thus if it is reasonable for the 
government to regulate or prohibit certain conduct in behalf 
of public health, ... safety, or general welfare, ... the fact that 
an otherwise legally binding contract undertaking to do that 
which is prohibited was entered into prior to the enactment 
of the prohibition will not save the behavior carried out in 
performance of the contract from illegality.l96 
In the context of CERCLA, a contract clause violation may be 
most readily asserted by generators who, despite their contrac-
tual transfer of responsibility to the transporters or waste site 
operators for the proper disposal of the wastes, are now being held 
strictly liable for the dumping of that waste pursuant to section 
107.197 
As with the due process clause, the Supreme Court's use of the 
contract clause as a tool to invalidate state and federal legislation 
that altered private contracts has been cyclical.l98 Under the lead-
ership of Chief Justice John Marshall, the Supreme Court used 
the contract clause extensively when invalidating statutes "that 
retrospectively impaired almost any contractual obligation."I99 
For example, the Supreme Court of the Marshall era200 was given 
its first opportunity to apply the contract clause in Fletcher v. 
Peck.2AJI At issue in Fletcher was the constitutionality of the Geor-
gia state legislature's repeal of a statutory grant of public land to 
194 Sands, supra note 18, at § 41.07. See, e.g., Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 109 (1947) 
("Immunity from federal regulation is not gained through forehanded contracts."); see 
also United States v. Northern Pacific Railway, 256 U.S. 51 (1921); WILUS, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 577 (1936). Note that for purposes of this Comment, the contract clause 
limitation will be with regard to federal action as applied through the due process clause. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. See generally, Calabresi, Retroactivity: Paramount Powers and Contractual 
Changes, 71 YALE L. J. 1191 (1962); Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: 
I-III, 57 HARV. L. REV. 512, 621, 852 (1944) (three part series). 
197 See generally CMAISuperfund Study, supra note 56, at Chapter VI-71. 
196 See generally NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 61, at 461-71. 
199 See also Hale I, supra note 196, at 512 for an in-depth analysis of early Supreme 
Court contract clause decisions. 
200 John Marshall was a member of the Supreme Court from 1801 to 1835. NOWAK, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 61, at 1094 (app. A). 
201 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (10 U.S.) (1810); see also New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch 
164 (1812); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat 518 (1819); Sturges v. Crowinshield, 
4 Wheat 122 (1819); Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat 1 (1823). 
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speculators. Peck had purchased some of this land and subse-
quently resold the acreage to Fletcher. The statutory repeal, 
however, destroyed Peck's good title to the land; Fletcher de-
manded a rescission of the contract and reimbursement of all 
money tendered. Marshall invalidated the state's action as it 
Hinterfere[ed] with established business and property inter-
ests."202 
The Supreme Court's expansive reading of the contract clause 
continued until the latter part of the nineteenth century.203 The 
Court's subsequent retreat from the use of the contract clause 
as a defense for property interests has been attributed to the 
judiciary's increased reliance upon the doctrine of substantive 
due process to void such legislation.2M As opined by one commen-
tator, there was "at least a tendency for the contract clause and 
the due process clause to coalesce" and that "the results might be 
the same if the contract clause were dropped out of the Constitu-
tion and challenged statutes all judged as reasonable or unrea-
sonable" under due process.205 In Lochner v. New York,206 for ex-
ample, the United States Supreme Court based its decision to 
invalidate the New York statute, which it held to interfere with 
the right of contract between employer and employee, upon no-
tions of due process. 
'The Supreme Court ended its long period of contract clause 
disuse in 1978, with its decision in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. 
Spannaus.207 At issue in that case was a Minnesota law which 
required that employees, who had worked in an excess of ten 
years for a company which had a pre-existing pension plan, be 
granted benefits upon termination or the closing of a plant re-
202 NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 61, at 463 quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 10 
U.S. at 87. For a discussion of the Fletcher decision see C. McGrath, Law and Politics in 
the New Republic-Yazoo: The Case of Fletcher v. Peck 70 (1966). 
203 See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880); Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 
25 (1878). During the latter part of the nineteenth century the Supreme Court's "invali-
dation of state laws impairing contract charter privileges reached its highest frequency. 
Between 1805 and 1888, there were forty-nine cases in which state laws were held invalid 
under the contract clause." GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 557 n.14 (10th ed. 1980), 
quoting U.S. CONST. 
204 NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 61, at 466-67. 
W5 Hale III, supra note 196, at 890. 
206 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. at 53; See supra text and notes at note 112. 
207 Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 234. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 
431 U.S. 1 (1977). 
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gardless of the provision of the employer's plan. In holding this 
law to be in violation of the contract clause, the Supreme Court 
considered the following factors: 
(1) whether the impairment of the contract interests was 
"su bstantial; "208 
(2) the extent of plaintiff-company's reliance upon the pre-
enactment pension plan;209 
(3) whether the law was necessary to remedy an "important 
and general social problem;"21o 
(4) whether the law was a temporary measure to deal with 
an emergency situation;211 and 
(5) whether the area regulated was one subject to previous 
regulation.212 
The factors of reliance interests213 and pre-existing regulations214 
were already considered by this Comment and thus, as alluded to 
earlier, the conclusions reached with regard to non-contractual 
interests under the due process clause are equally applicable to 
this contract clause analysis.215 When applying the remaining 
considerations it appears that the retroactive application of sec-
tion 107 would not be invalid under the contract clause. 
First, whether the impairment of the contract interests was 
"substantial" will vary from case-to-case. Allied Structural Steel, 
provides the following standard: 
... Minimal alteration of contractual obligations may end the 
inquiry at its first stage. Severe impairment, on the other 
hand, will push the inquiry to a careful examination of the 
nature and purpose of the ... legislation.216 
Assume then that the retrospective application of section 107 
completely obliterates all contractual agreements between a 
generator and its transporter and as such the contract is deemed 
substantially impaired. In light of the remaining considerations, 
CERCLA's retroactive application still should be upheld. 
CERCLA undoubtedly would satisfy the third factor as it was 
208 Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 234-35. 
209 Id. at 246. 
210 Id. at 250. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
213 See supra text and notes at notes 144-48. 
214 See supra text and notes at notes 150-60. 
215 See supra text and notes at notes 194-96. 
216 Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 245. 
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enacted purposely to remedy "the important and general ... "217 
problem of abandoned waste sites. In light of the documented 
environmental and health effects of such sites,218 it would be 
difficult to imagine a more rational and necessary purpose for 
impairing contractual interests.219 
Finally, although the liability provisions were not enacted tem-
porarily, the dangerous nature of abandoned waste sites may in 
many situations constitute "emergencies" necessitating immedi-
ate legislative attention.220 Moreover, as already pointed out in 
this Comment, section 107(e)(1)-(2) preserves a generator's right to 
seek indemnification from a transporter in a separate cause of 
action.221 In short, when balancing the public purpose to be served 
with the impairment of the contractual interests, the retroactive 
application should be considered both necessary and rational. , 
Note that the defendants in South Carolina Recycling also 
challenged the EPA's CERCLA section 107 claim as being in 
violation of the contract clause.222 That challenge was not, how-
ever, based upon any claims of retroactivity. Nevertheless, the 
court rejected that claim based upon the following reasoning: 
... [E]ven if the [C]ontract [C]lause were construed to apply to 
CERCLA, the Act has not operated substantially to impair 
these defendants' waste disposal contracts with [the site 
owner]. On the contrary, the contracts remain valid and en-
forceable between the parties. There is nothing to prevent a 
generator defendant held liable here from seeking indemnity 
for [the site owner] under their contract.223 
This rationale should be considered equally applicable to a ret-
roactive claim based upon the same constitutional provision. 
3. Takings Clause 
The takings clause of the fifth amendment may also be used to 
challenge the retroactive application of CERCLA as it prohibits 
the government's taking of private property for public use, with-
out just compensation.224 With regard to CERCLA, a takings chal-
217Id. 
218 EPA Survey, supra note 2. 
219 See Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 242-45; United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25. 
220 See, e.g., H. R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., supra note 30 at 18. 
221 42 U.S.C. § 9607(eXl)-(2). See supra text and notes at note 181. 
222 South Carolina Recycling, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. at 20276. 
223 Id. 
224 See generally CMAISuperfund Study, supra note 56, at Chapter VI-28-35. 
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lenge has been alleged by some commentators in the following 
situations: First, the owners of the property upon which an aban-
doned waste site is situated may allege that the government's 
remedial action taken pursuant to section 104 constitutes a taking 
of their property.225 Second, an administrative order under section 
106 may mandate clean-up measures which result in a complete 
restriction upon any subsequent use of the property.226 
As with the general due process and contractual interests al-
ready discussed under the due process clause, there is no one 
uniform test to determine whether there has been an unconstitu-
tional taking. The Supreme Court recently acknowledged this fact 
in Kaiser Aetna v. United States 227 when it stated: 
[T]his Court has generally "been unable to develop any 'set 
formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require 
that economic injuries caused by public action be compen-
sated by the government, rather than remain dispropor-
tionately concentrated on a few persons." Rather, it has ex-
amined the "taking" question by engaging in essentially ad 
hoc, factual inquiries.228 
Indeed, the Supreme Court's utilization of such "ad hoc factual 
inquiries" has resulted in a variety of standards to determine 
constitutionality under the takings clause. 
The first "general rule" was set forth by Justice Holmes in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,229 a case in which a bill of equity 
was sought to prevent the Pennsylvania Coal Company from 
mining under the plaintiff's property in such a way as to remove 
supports and cause a subsidence of the surface and of the plain-
tiff's house. The plaintiffs had signed a deed in 1878 which ex-
pressly reserved the coal company's right to remove all the coal 
under the property conveyed, and further stated that the grantee 
225 See CMAlSuperfund Study, supra note 56, at Chapter VI-75. 
226 Id. at Chapter VI-77. 
227 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295 (1981). 
228 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175. Many commentators have also recognized this lack of 
uniformity and have thus attempted to articulate a general "taking test." See, e.g., 
Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation of 
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and the Police 
Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) (Sax I); Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 
YALE L.J. 149 (1971) (Sax II); Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Takings Problem, 49 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 165 (1974); Dunham, Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 
1962 SUP. CT. REV. 63. 
229 Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
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received the property with all risks accompanying the purchase of 
only the surface rights. In addition, the deed also contained an 
express waiver for all claims of damages which might have arisen 
out of the mining of the coal.230 The plaintiffs recognized this 
waiver but alleged that any rights once belonging to the coal 
company were removed by the Kohler Act of 1921, which prohib-
ited the mining of anthracite coal in such a way as to cause tbe 
subsidence of, among other things, dwelling homes. The coal com-
pany alleged this Act to be unconstitutional under the takings 
clause.231 In addressing this issue, the Court set forth the follow-
ing rule: 
[T]hat while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if 
a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking .... 
As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under an im-
plied limitation and must yield to the police power. But obvi-
ously the implied limitation must have its limits, or the con-
tract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for consid-
eration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminu-
tion.232 (emphasis added) 
Based upon this proposition, Holmes declared Pennsylvania's 
Kohler Act unconstitutional as an undue regulation of the prop-
erty of the coal company.233 
U sing Holmes' reasoning in Pennsylvania Coal, the courts have 
continued to use a balancing test which weighs "the public ben-
efits of the regulation against the extent of loss of property 
values."234 Therefore, legislation or regulatory action will usually 
be deemed unconstitutional under the takings clause where the 
balance of private and public interests demonstrates "that the 
public at large, rather than a single owner must bear the burden 
of an exercise of [government] power in the public interest."235 
A variety of criteria have been used by the Supreme Court, 
either singularly or collectively, when balancing private with pub-
lic interests.236 One consideration, as alluded to in Pennsylvania 
230 Id. at 412. 
231 Id. at 404-12. 
232 Id. at 413. 
233 Id. at 416. 
234 WRIGHT & GrrELMAN, LAND USE 409 (3d. ed. 1981). 
235 CMAJ Superfund Study, supra note 56, at Chapter VI-30, quoting Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 
306 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring). 
236 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962), discussed infra text Ilnd 
notes at notes 257-60, is an example of a decision wherein a number of tests were used to 
determine the constitutionality of a government action. 
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Coal case, is whether the government action or legislation inter-
feres with reasonable and distinct investment backed expecta-
tions.237 This criteria was recently used by the Supreme Court in 
Kaisner Aetna.238 In that case the owners of a private pond ob-
tained government approval to convert the pond into a marina. 
The owner intended to charge non-resident boat owners a fee for 
the use of the marina. After the construction had been completed, 
however, the government ordered that the marina be open to the 
public, as the improvements had connected the pond to public, 
navigable waters. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding the gov-
ernment's order to be a taking: 
While the consent of individual officials representing the 
United States cannot "estop" the United States, it can lead to 
the fruition of a number of expectancies embodied in the 
concept of 'property' -expectancies that, if sufficiently impor-
tant, the Government must condemn and pay for before it 
takes over management of the landowner's property.239 (em-
phasis added) 
When applying this theory to CERCLA, opponents of the Act's 
retroactive application argue that pre-enactment action, or inac-
tion, taken by landowners was based upon their "expectancies" in 
the existing laws.240 This argument is without merit for two rea-
sons. First, as noted earlier, waste sites were already subject to 
extensive regulation under both the statutory system and the 
common law.241 Hence it would be unreasonable for a waste con-
tributor to expect that the regulatory system would not change or 
that such regulations were essentially a permit to pollute. Second, 
this argument is essentially the same as that discussed earlier 
under the terminology of "reliance interest." Similarly, therefore, 
this argument is substantially weakened when these invest-
ment-backed expectancies are balanced against the public's 
"expectancies" in a safe and clean environment.242 
Another related standard employed by the Supreme Court in 
deciding cases brought pursuant to the takings clause is whether 
the government legislation or action denies the landowner any 
237 See Penn. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413. See also Berger, supra note 228, at 175-77. 
238 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 174-75. 
239 Id. at 179-80. In Kaiser, the "expectancy" was deemed to be "right to exclude." 
240 See CMAISuperfund Study, supra note 56, at Chapter VI-32. 
24\ See supra text and notes at notes 150-61. 
242 See supra text and notes at notes 143-48. 
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economically viable use of the land.243 This criteria was considered 
by the Supreme Court in Penn Central Transporta tion Co. v. New 
York City.244 At issue in that case was the constitutionality of New 
York City's Landmarks and Preservation Law. Under that stat-
ute law, Grand Central Station, owned by the plaintiff, was desig-
nated as a landmark. After the agency responsible for the en-
forcement of the law denied plaintiff's permission to build a 
multi-story office building over the existing structure-on the 
grounds that the proposed building would impair the aesthetic 
quality of the existing terminal-the plaintiff brought suit under 
the takings clause.245 The court rejected the plaintiff's challenge 
and held that so long as the plaintiffs were not deprived of any 
reasonably beneficial use of the landmark site, the law would not 
constitute a taking.246 
U sing this criteria in a CERCLA action, a landowner may 
argue that the cleanup actions ordered by the EPA or those 
already implemented by the government has rendered the prop-
erty economically useless.247 However, as proponents of the tak-
ings challenge to CERCLA have themselves admitted, the prior 
use of the land as a dump site in and of itself will usually render 
the property useless for any other purpose.248 This argument is 
certainly exemplified by the Love Canal disaster249 where the 
dump site was plowed over and, tragically, later sold for purposes 
of building a school. The land was rendered economically useless, 
not because of remedial activities taken pursuant to CERCLA, 
but rather due to the hazardous nature of the improperly dumped 
wastes. 
243 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 u.s. at 260; Pennsylvania Central Transportation Co. 
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978). See also CMNSuperfund Study, supra 
note 56, at Chapter VI-30. 
244 Penn Central Transportation, 438 U.S. at 105. 
245 I d. at 115-22. 
246 I d. at 122. The court based its decision upon the fact that plaintiff still retained the 
following "uses" and rights; (1) plaintiffs were entitled to use the property as it had been 
for the preceding sixty-five years. Id. at 136; (2) their continued use of the structure 
permitted them to profit from the t:!rminal and obtain a reasonable return on their 
investment. Id.; (3) plaintiffs were not prohibited from occupying any airspace as they 
still had permission to apply for a permit to build a smaller structure. Id. at 137; and 
(4) their air rights were transferable to other structures in the vicinity which were found 
suitable for such construction. Id. 
247 See generally Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
248 See CMNSuperfund Study, supra note 56, at Chapter VI-30 n.43. 
249 See supra text and notes at note 29. 
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A third factor often considered by the Supreme Court is 
whether the interference with the property may be characterized 
as a permanent physical invasion by the government.250 Based 
upon this factor, opponents of applying CERCLA retroactively 
argue that the government's remedial measures may consist of 
physical activities which permanently occupy the landowners 
property and as such constitute a taking.251 This argument is 
based upon the holding in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV COrp.,252 where the Supreme Court invalidated a New York 
law which forced landlords to allow the installation of cable televi-
sion equipment on their buildings. The Supreme Court deemed 
such a mandate to be "a per se taking" as it constituted a perma-
nent physical occupation of the owner's real property. In light of 
this "serious form of invasion of an owner's property interests,"253 
the Court did not find it necessary to consider the public benefit 
resulting from the cable service. 
Reliance upon the particular analysis of TeZepromptor is c:!spe-
cially misplaced in the hazardous waste situation. In light of the 
extreme public health and safety factors involved with a typical 
abandoned site, the permanent physical occupation of the owner's 
property would probably be considered not only justifiable, but 
necessary. This conclusion is soundly based on numerous deci-
sions which have held waste site property owners strictly liable 
pursuant to both CERCLA and RCRA.254 
Finally, courts have invalidated government interference with 
private property using the so-called "noxious-use or harm-
benefit" approach.2M As described by one commentator, a court 
following this approach 
examines the nature of the use adversely affected by the 
government regulation or activity to determine whether it is 
noxious, wrongful, harmful or prejudicial to the health, 
safety or morals of the public. If so found, then the govern-
ment may validly regulate it and thereby decrease its value 
without payment of compensation to the owner.256 
This approach was followed by the Supreme Court in the case of 
250 Loretto v. Teiepromptor Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425 (1982). 
251 See CMNSuperfund Study, supra note 56, at Chapter VI-33-34. 
252 Loretto v. Telepromptor, 458 U.S. at 426. 
253 ld. 
254 See supra note 67. 
255 See Berger, supra note 226, at 179-82. See also Sax I, supra note 226, at 48-50. 
256 Berger, supra note 228, at 172. 
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Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead.257 In that case, the plaintiffs, who 
had engaged in dredging and pit excavations, claimed that an 
ordinance regulating such operations on property within town 
limits effectively prevented them from continuing their business 
and therefore constituted a taking of their property without due 
process of law. The Court, however, disagreed and held the regu-
lation to be a valid "safety measure."258 It is significant that 
although the plaintiffs alleged that the regulation completely 
destroyed the mining utility of the property, they failed to estab-
lish any other uses which would render the property valuable.259 
The noxious-use approach offers a particularly persuasive ra-
tionale for upholding CERCLA's retroactive application under 
the takings clause. First, the government's remedial or removal 
actions under CERCLA are taken to protect compelling public 
health and safety interests; there is, therefore, a direct and rea-
sonable relationship between such actions and the protection of 
the public health and environment. Second, as noted earlier, the 
nature of hazardous waste disposal activities renders the prop-
erty upon which the site was situated economically and physically 
useless.260 Consequently, when balancing the public health, safety 
and welfare purposes underlying government activities brought 
pursuant to CERCLA, any takings clause challenge to the Act 
should fail. 
B. The Ex Post Facto Doctrine as a Challenge to CERCLA's 
Retroactive Application 
A final constitutional challenge that could be asserted against a 
limited number of CERCLA provisions is Article I, § 9 of the 
United States Constitution which forbids the enactment of ex 
post facto laws by the national government.261 While it is well 
established that this prohibition is limited in application to ret-
roactive laws of criminal nature,262 a statute need not, however, 
be expressly criminal to come within the limitation of the ex post 
257 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-94 (1962). 
258 ld. at 595. Note that this action was brought pursuant to the analogous state due 
process clause, U.S. CONST. art. XIV. 
259 See generally Sax II, supra note 220, at 42 for a discussion of this point and of the 
Goldblatt decision in general. 
260 See supra text and notes at notes 246-47. 
261 See generally Comment, Generator Liability, supra note 30, at 1246-47. 
262 See Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall (3 U.S.) 386 (1798). 
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facto provision.263 Hence the following Superfund penalty provi-
sions, if deemed criminal in nature, may constitute a violation of 
the ex post facto doctrine if applied retroactively: (1) section 
103(b)(3),264 which imposes a fine or imprisonment for failure to 
provide notice of unpermitted releases; (2) section 106(b), which 
imposes a fine for failure to comply with an administrative order; 
and (3) section 107(C)(3), which imposes punitive damages for 
failure to take removal or remedial action ordered by the EPA. 
To determine whether a statutory sanction is criminal in na-
ture, for purposes of the ex post facto doctrine,265 the Supreme 
Court in DeVeau v. Braisted266 set forth the following test: 
The question in each case where unpleasant consequences 
are brought to bear upon an individual for prior conduct, is 
whether the legislative aim was to punish that individual for 
past activity, or whether the restriction of this individual 
comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a present 
situation . ... 267 (emphasis added) 
In DeVeau the Supreme Court considered, inter alia,268 the con-
stitutionality of section 8 of the New York Waterfront Commis-
sion Act of 1953,269 which essentially disqualified from holding 
office in any waterfront labor organization any convicted felon 
who had not been subsequently pardoned by the Board of Parole. 
The appellant had been a member of a waterfront labor organiza-
tion since 1950 and later served both as that group's bargaining 
representative and also its secretary-treasurer. Three years prior 
to receiving his membership, however, appellant had pleaded 
guilty to and received a suspended sentence for a charge of grand 
larceny. In 1956, three years after the enactment of the Act, the 
appellant was told that because of his conviction, section 8 of the 
Act prohibited any person from collecting dues on behalf of his 
'63 See generally Sands, supra note 18, at §§ 42.01-.03. 
264 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b)(3). 
265 Other elaborate tests have been devised by the Supreme Court for purposes of 
determining whether a statute or provisions thereof is criminal in nature when chal-
lenged on the grounds of U.S. CONST. art. I, the right against self-incrimination. See, e.g., 
Ward v. Coleman, 598 F.2d 1187 (10th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 448 U.S. 242 (1980). 
'66 DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960). 
'67 [d. at 160. 
,"" The other issues considered by the Supreme Court in Deveau were: 
(1) whether the provision violated the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion; and (2) whether it violated the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. 
269 New York Waterfront Commission Act of 1953, § 6700a (McKinney 1953). 
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labor organization so long as he remained its officer or agent. As a 
result of this notification the labor organization suspended appel-
lant as an officer.27o 
Applying the test set forth above, the Supreme Court rejected 
the ex post facto doctrine challenge and stated: 
The proof is overwhelming that New York sought not to 
punish ex-felons, but to devise what was felt to be a much-
needed scheme of regulation of the waterfront. (emphasis 
added)271 
When applying the "De-Veau" test to the Superfund penalty pro-
visions, it would seem that any challenge premised upon the ex 
post facto doctrine must fail. As alleged earlier, the purpose of 
CERCLA, and hence the purpose for which its penalty provisions 
are imposed, is regulatory or remediaP72 Rather than creating 
new substantive duties, CERCLA merely codifies long standing 
common law principles. The liability and penalty provisions were 
established to compensate the costs expended by the government 
to clean up past disposal practices that today threaten public 
health and environment. Penalties are thus imposed without ref-
erence to prior practices or standards; rather they arise solely as 
a result of present conditions.273 The ex post facto challenge is not a 
novel one as illustrated by comments taken from the Act's legisla-
tive history: 
The CMA charge that Superfund constitutes an ex post facto 
denial of due process on the grounds that it somehow 
broadens liability beyond that which existed at the time 
wastes were placed in the site, is politically [sic] advocacy, not 
good law. It is well established that the constitutional prohi-
bition against ex post facto laws, with very narrow exceptions, 
applies only to criminal laws. The relevant provisions of the 
proposed legislation are not criminal laws. Further, the 
evolving case law surrounding hazardous chemicals as well 
as waste desposal sites has recognized that it is the present 
condition of the disposal site which must be repaired, regard-
less of whether the seeds culminating in the condition were 
sown a number of years ago.274 
270 DeVeau, supra note 266, at 145-46. 
271 I d. at 160. 
272 See supra text and notes at notes 150-53. 
273 Costle letter, supra note 161, at 98; See also supra text and notes at notes 151-53. 
274 Costle letter, supra note 161, at 98. 
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In short, because CERCLA may be characterized as remedial in 
nature and the Act's legislative history is devoid of any reference 
to criminal liability, challenges based upon the ex post facto doc-
trine will most probably fail.275 
v. CONCLUSION 
As stressed throughout this article, CERCLA's goal is to 
remedy today's hazardous waste problems caused by yesterday's 
improper disposal practices. In order to effectuate this con-
gressional purpose it is thus necessary to apply CERCLA to the 
present effects of past conduct. This was the conclusion reached in 
Georgeoff with regard to pre-enactment transporters of waste 
materials. That court determined that from CERCLA's legisla-
tive history it was clear that the Act was intended to reach 
activities which took place prior to its enactment.276 The court's 
holding did not include, however, a determination of whether 
such a retrospective application of CERCLA would be constitu-
tional. 
In NEPACCO the court became the first to expressly rule that 
not only was it Congress' intent to apply CERCLA retroactively 
to impose liability for preenactment damages, but it was also 
constitutional to do so. The NEPACCO court based this holding 
upon a "rationality standard" as set forth in the case of Turner 
Elkhorn. 277 
Yet the NEPACCO court did not provide any guidance as to 
the factors a court should consider when assessing rationality. 
This article therefore examined these factors, as set forth in 
Nachman, and like the NEPACCO court, concluded that the ret-
roactive application of Superfund satisfies the due process clause 
of the fifth amendment.278 
Constitutional challeges to CERCLA's retroactive application 
brought pursuant to the contract clause,279 the takings clause 
and the ex post facto doctrine, have yet to be addressed by any 
federal court. This article concludes that any court faced with 
challenges based upon these constitutional provisions should not 
275 Accord, Comment, Generator Liability, supra note 24, at 1247. 
276 For a discussion of Ohio v. Georgeoff, see supra text and notes at notes 75-105. 
277 See supra text and notes at notes 128-33. 
278 See supra text and notes at notes 134-92. 
279 But see South Carolina Recycling, supra text and notes at notes 222-23. 
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deem such provisions to be obstacles to CERCLA's retroactive 
application. To hold otherwise would essentially insulate a 
generator, transporter, dumpsite owner or operator, who in the 
past benefited from the production and disposal of waste prod-
ucts, from any continuing responsibilities for the present hazards 
they have created. 
